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I believe that we are undergoing a major reorganization of inter-
national life at the present time which will result in drastic modifica-
tion of the world order system that has prevailed since the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648. This reorganization is being brought about
through the efforts of powerful economic, political, and cultural actors
on the world stage to cope with the challenge of growing interde-
pendence during a period in which critical resources may be in short
supply. Coping can be conceived in relation to immediate issues, such
as shortfalls in fuel during the months ahead, or more structurally, as
recurrent failure to satisfy basic human and societal needs. This reor-
ganization of international life has two principal features-increased
central guidance, and increased roles for nonterritorial actors. There
are many uncertainties concerning the nature and orientation of the
nonterritorial actors, the pace of various changes, and the type and
control of the emergent central guidance mechanisms. It is possible
for international law and lawyers to influence the process by which
these uncertainties get resolved and even to accelerate the transition
to a new system of world order.
This article supports the proposition that international law and
lawyers can play a significant and beneficial role during this period of
transition, but only if they become sensitive to the wider process of
change underway in international society and, more controversially, if
they give self-conscious support to a set of explicit world order goals
that structure both the means and the ends of transition. Sir Paul
Vinogradoff provides a touchstone for my theme. In the course of
arguing that a comparison among various historical types of inter-
national law is necessary to achieve an understanding of "what is
* This article is a revision of material originally delivered as the Sherrill Lectures at
Yale University, March 1974.
t Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Princeton University.
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essential and what is accidental in the transformations of law,"' he
eloquently describes the potential role of the international lawyer:
In this quest for the spirit of the laws we are certainly not ani-
mated by fatalistic resignation. As knowledge of the laws of nature
does not deprive men of the possibility of turning them to profit,
so the logical force of ideas does not condemn societies to go adrift
under the sway of currents of opinion .... [F]ar-seeing guides,
determined leaders, fruitful workers are no less necessary in the
outward social movement than are explorers, inventors, well-
equipped craftsmen in the material world. The best vessel may be
the victim of shipwreck, but it is the pride of free men to oppose
danger by farsighted and stubborn efforts.2
I believe it is possible for international lawyers to contribute to the
work of constructing "the best vessel" to which Vinogradoff refers us,
but their contribution is by no means assured. Indeed, international
law and lawyers often follow prevailing lines of power and wealth; in
the current context this tendency would serve to accentuate the de-
ficiencies of the old system and encourage the emergence of a regres-
sive variant of central guidance. That is, unless international lawyers
become actively conscious of the positive central guidance options that
exist, their principal role will be to serve those international actors
who currently control behavior and who are characteristically tending
toward exploitative and dangerous patterns of adaptation to the mount-
ing transitional pressures.
It is important not to exaggerate the prospects even for enlightened
approaches. Even aside from the question of gaining influence, those
with an enlightened view may still not accomplish much. As Vino-
gradoff suggests, even the best vessel may fall victim to shipwreck. The
dimensions of our juridical ship mainly reflect the anthropological,
social, economic, political, and technological circumstances that to-
gether constitute an historical context. If we are to have any realistic
prospect at all of reshaping this context, we must accurately appreciate
the constraints as well as the options.
1. Vinogradoff, Historical Types of International Law, 1 BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIANA 8
(1923). See J. BRIERLY, The Basis of Obligation in International Law, in THE BASIS OF
OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER PAPERS BY THE LATE JAMES LESLIE BRIERLY
1, 2 (H. Lauterpacht & C. Waldock eds. 1958):
There is a subtle interaction between theory and practice in politics, not always easy
to trace because the actors themselves may easily be unconscious of their theoretical
prepossessions which, nevertheless, powerfully influence their whole attitude towards
practical affairs; and at no time has it been so important, as it is today, that we
should see the facts of international life as they really are, and not as they come to
us reflected in false or outworn theories.
2. Vinogradoff, supra note 1.
Vol. 84: 969, 1975
A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies
An intriguing passage appears in Henry Kissinger's Harvard dis-
sertation:
The success of physical science depends on the selection of the
crucial experiment; that of political science in the field of inter-
national affairs, on the selection of the "crucial" period. I have
chosen for my topic the period between 1812 and 1822, partly, I
am frank to say, because its problems seem to me analogous to
those of our day.3
I agree with Mr. Kissinger that insight into the present situation can
be gainfully achieved by a careful study of a relevant historical period.
However, I believe that Kissinger, along with many others of his gen-
eration, has chosen the wrong historical analogy. The reason for choos-
ing the 19th century is obvious. It was a time when an international
aggressor, Napoleonic France, was successfully neutralized by a coali-
tion of conservative states through a diplomacy that constructed a
relatively stable system. In Kissinger's view, the problem of our age,
perhaps of any age, is to prevent revolutionary actors from mounting a
challenge against the existing order. In our age, this objective has in-
volved confronting first Hitler's Germany, then the Soviet Union and
most recently, the Third World. Succinctly put, Kissinger's utopia is
stability.
4
It is my judgment that, although the 19th century analogy (or, to
use a 20th century term, the "Munich lesson") is an important one for
policymakers to study, far more important is the analogy which can be
drawn from the 17th century transition to the modem state system. In
effect, the transition analogy can help us to fashion the "major
premise" on which to base a viable strategy of global reform. As I see
it, the tragedy of our age is that the leaders of many countries, includ-
ing our own, act as if the minor premise of deterring aggressors were the
major premise of building a post-nation-state system of world order.
Such leaders act, moreover, as if the major premise reflected nothing
more substantial than wild musings or wishful thinking.
The world order shift now underway seems to be a reversal of the
shift completed in the middle of the 17th century, by which time
Medieval Europe had given way to the modem state system. The 17th
century completed a long process of historical movement away from
nonterritorial central guidance and toward territorial decentralization,
3. Quoted in S. GRAUBARD, KISsINGER: PORTRAIT OF A MIND 10 (1973).
4. Kissinger's main academic works dwell on this central theme. Perhaps it is most
fully and starkly depicted in his principal works on contemporary international relations.
See THE NECESSITY FOR CHOICE: PRosPECTs OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1961); NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY (1957).
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whereas the contemporary transition process seems headed back toward
nonterritorial central guidance. In each context we shall consider the
transition interval and try to identify some of the prefigurations of the
future embedded in changing forms. Intimations of transition can be
found in many elements of cultural expression. Indeed, it is the artists
who often are the first to express the handwriting on the wall.
The transition interval is one during which elements of the new
system intermingle with elements of the old. It may go on for several
centuries. Its boundaries are often the subject of prolonged scholarly
dispute. Even its reality may be controversial, at least until established
in retrospect. Beyond all doubt developments occur unevenly. There
were European territorial states in existence long prior to Westphalia;
for example, England possessed most of the features of a territorial
state from the 13th century onwards. Indeed, one specialist writes that
"[b]y 1300 it was evident that the dominant political form in Western
Europe was going to be the sovereign state." 5 But what this historian
had discerned was only an incipient tendency, one which subsequently
accumulated momentum over a long period of time. The state is the
main building block of "the state system," but its existence did not
assure the emergence of the specific pattern of international relations
that began to take shape in the 17th century. For this reason it remains
valid to associate the origins of the modem state system with the Peace
of Westphalia, with the understanding that such a generalization is a
focusing device to bring broad patterns of change into clear delinea-
tion, at the cost of blurring details.
In this spirit of seeking to grasp world order patterns, and more
especially the characteristics of a transition period during which one
pattern gives way to another, I will pose several main questions that
help focus inquiry into the role of international law and international
lawyers. What can we learn from this prior transition process which
culminated in the birth of the state system? What roles were played by
international law and lawyers? To what extent is this historical ex-
perience transferable to the present transition context? How can in-
ternational law and international lawyers help assure the emergence of
a new post-state system of world order that is relatively more peaceful
and just? Does the participation of international lawyers depend upon
their national, ideological, cultural, socio-economic locus of concerns?
Is it possible to formulate a position on the means and ends of transi-
tion that could serve as the basis for a transnational or global consensus
5. J. STRAYER, ON THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE MODERN STATE 57 (1970).
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and thereby provide the normative grounding for a political movement
dedicated to global reform? This article responds to such questions, to
some more directly than to others, but with the overall objective of
helping to formulate a world order ideology appropriate to human
needs and aspirations, given the present historical situation of chal-
lenge and opportunity.
It may be helpful to set forth the main elements of my argument at
the outset:
(1) The state system is being superseded by a series of interlocking
social, economic, political, technological, and ecological tendencies
which are likely to eventuate in some form of negative utopia, i.e., in
a very undesirable and dangerous structure of response to the problems
posed by the deepening crisis in the state system.
(2) Although this disquieting outcome seems probable as of now, it
is not inevitable. There is also a positive option premised upon an
affirmation of the wholeness of the planet and the solidarity of the
human species that could bring about a rearrangement of power,
wealth, and authority that would be more beneficial than anything the
world has heretofore known.0
(3) Initially, the global reform movement needed to promote such a
positive outcome has to take principal shape outside of and mainly in
opposition to the centers of constituted political and economic power:
it will almost certainly have to be populist and antigovernmental in
character and origins.1 Such a movement should be premised upon
nonviolence to the extent possible.
(4) The principal initial focus of a movement for positive global
reform should involve education-for-action, that is, a demonstration
that the felt needs and frustrations of people in a variety of concrete
social circumstances around the world arise from the inability of
governments or the existing multinational actors to find short-range,
middle-level, and long-range solutions to the distresses and dangers of
our world.
8
(5) The case for global reform should be premised on a basic as-
6. In actuality there is a cluster of organizational options that follows from the adop-
tion and implementation of an orientation toward global reform that accepts the eco-
logical and ethical premises specified in the text. See R. FALK, A STUDY oF FUTURE WORLDS
(1975).
7. Fouad Ajami specifies the contours of such a movement in a stimulating paper. The
Global Populists: Third-World Nations and World-Order Crises (Princeton Univ. Center
of Int'l Studies, Research Monograph No. 41, May 1974).
8. Rethinking the attachment of people to the state is one essential element in fashion-
ing an adequate strategy of response to world order challenges. In this regard, see Schaar,
Power and Purity, 19 A, . REv. 162-79 (1974); Schaar, The Case for Patriotism, 17 AM.
REv. 59-99 (1973).
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sessment of structural trends and options. It need not rest altogether
on the collision course that apocalyptic reformers are conveniently
programming to take effect around the year 2000.9 We should be
somewhat suspicious about the recent show of millennial egoism, the
notion that we either change by the year 2000 or everything is lost.'0
There is a temptation to deliver an apocalyptic sermon to the wayward
citizenry of Nineveh, but such a message would probably be shaped
by the characteristic desire of mortals to witness the completion of
their own reform projects within the compass of their probable life-
times. My inclination is to adopt the perspective of that retired French
general who wanted to plant in his garden some species of trees that
he had grown to love during his years of service in an Asian country.
When told by his gardener that such trees would not blossom for 70
years, long after his death, the general is supposed to have said, "In
that case, don't wait until after lunch to plant them."
Can international law and lawyers play a significant role in relation
to a credible strategy of global reform? The language and sensibility of
law tend to be static. New modes of thought, new orientations are
needed if law and lawyers are to achieve a dynamic, processive perspec-
tive. Such an outlook is obviously essential to the whole idea of a
transition process in the course of which the very framework of legal
relations would undergo fundamental change. Can we develop an
interpretation of that transition process that international lawyers can
use to analyze the main developments of international life that call
for the application of legal techniques such as negotiation, adjudica-
tion, treaty-making, and institution-building? Without such an inter-
pretation the characteristic problems of the day-whether they be the
status of prisoners of war, claims to impose or disrupt an oil embargo,
the status of military reprisals, or satellite surveillance-are fed back
into an obsolete framework of interstate relations where the irrelevant
cynicism of the Machiavellians jousts with the irrelevant moralism and
legalism of the idealists. We do not need judgments of approval and
disapproval nearly as much as we need a set of values that can inform
a strategy of change. What was "realism" a generation ago when the
state system was able to deal adequately with the main problems of
the day becomes "crackpot realism" in the current world setting. Re-
gardless of our normative outlook, we require a new framework to
comprehend the dynamics of global transformation.
9. See, e.g., B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE (1971); P. EHRLICH, TIlE POPULATION
BoMB (1968).
10. See Lewis, Oil, Other Scarcities and the Poor Countries, 27 WORLD POLITICS 63-86
(1974).
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It is my hope that this new framework can perform a social and po-
litical, as well as an intellectual role, by helping to mobilize a norma-
tive consensus that challenges the prevailing ethical currents of neo-
Darwinian sentiment and policy. As matters now stand, the process of
transition is being dominated by those who believe that the privilege
of the few in the face of the misery of the many is either inevitable
or actually beneficial, providing a necessary foundation for human
excellence and accomplishment. The central feature of the normative
challenge that I would propose as a counter rests upon an acceptance
of human solidarity and all of its implications, especially a shared re-
sponsibility to seek equity and dignity for every person on the planet
without regard to matters of national identity or territorial boundary.
I
Since the 17th century the territorial state has been the principal
organizing unit in global politics, and national governments have been
the principal actors. Modern international law arose to give juridical
expression to this political reality." It was a political reality that began
to take shape in medieval Europe, but subsequently assumed global
significance, through a combination of Western superiority over other
regional systems of organization, and the actual physical colonizing and
missionizing processes that managed to extend the sway of this Euro-
centric system over most of the rest of the world. That is, there are
other regional systems of multistate law, but none whose claims of
universal applicability achieved such plausibility as a result of the ex-
tension of actual influence beyond the region of its origins.'
2
Since Grotius, if not before, this juridical consensus has provided
international lawyers with a generally shared framework.' 3 To trans-
11. There are as many types of international law as there are distinct types of
political reality. And, indeed, if states become less predominant in managing global rela-
tions, then we would expect a new legal order in which other actors played more signif-
icant actual and formal roles.
12. See B. RLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN EXPANDED WORLD (1960). For fuller dis-
cussion of the legal traditions active in maintaining interstate order in other regions of
the world, see A. BOZEMAN, THE FUTURE OF LAW IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD (1971); F.
NORTHRUP, THE TAMING OF NATIONS (1952).
13. It was Grotius, however, who set forth the normative foundations for a world of
separate territorial sovereignties with distinct claims of autonomy, in a major treatise on
the relevance of law to war. See H. GROIlus, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (A. Campbell
transl. 1901). The essence of the modernist element in Grotius was his refusal to recognize
a decisionmaker higher than the head of state, or an interpreter of legal obligation other
than that head of state. Even though he believed that legal rules have an objective
character, he regarded their application as dependent on subjective appreciation by
juridically equal state leaders. For an analysis of thinkers who antedate Grotius such as
Vitoria, Suarez and Gentili, see P. CORBETT, LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE RELATIONS OF STATES
17-24 (1951); A. NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 79-101 (rev. ed.
1954).
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form it will require a new perception of a changing political reality,
and an awareness that the juridical articulation of the perception can
influence the balance of choice among historical options, as well as
condition the moral quality of the prevailing option. Vinogradoff
understood that while not all options are historically plausible, neither
is there an inevitable historical current that predetermines the world
order outcome. Some human pressure on the rudder at the right mo-
ment may avert collision, or even assure that the voyage is a pleasant
one. What I am arguing is that international legal studies remain, by
and large, ignorant of the system-changing context, and that we com-
pound the tragedies in store for us by not fashioning a new juridical
expression which corresponds to the political realities that are moving
the world system from one of relatively decentralized, if hierarchically
arranged, statism to relatively centralized, but not yet predetermined,
rearrangements of managerial control and value priorities.
Thomas Kuhn has attracted considerable attention through his de-
piction of the structure of scientific revolutions. His basic observation,
relevant to our purposes, is that natural scientists at any given time
work within a paradigm of shared assumptions, traditions, and proce-
dures, to solve the characteristic problems confronting their profession.
Kuhn describes a paradigm as "universally recognized scientific
achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to
a community of practitioners."' 14 Such a paradigm sets boundaries on
research and creates a set of intellectual taboos that prevail until
challenged by new discoveries, so-called anomalies, that are not ex-
plicable within the reigning paradigm and yet appear too significant
to ignore or disavow.15 It is at such a point that a scientific revolution
occurs and a new paradigm is crystallized, in order to allow the work
of the profession to proceed with maximum efficiency because a large
fundamental area of agreement can again be taken for granted.
Kuhn has been properly critical of facile extrapolations of his ideas
14. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS viii (2d ed. 1970). Later Kuhn
defines a paradigm as follows: "A paradigm is what the members of a scientific community
share, and, conversely, a scientific community consists of men who share a paradigm." Id.
at 176. He distinguishes between two different senses in which the term "paradigm" is
used: "On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques,
and so on shared by the members of a given community. On the other, it denotes one
sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as
models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining
puzzles of normal science." Id. at 175.
15. Id. at 97. During a period in which a paradigm is securely established, the bound-
aries of what constitutes knowledge are firm. Claims to discovery or explanation beyond
such boundaries are repudiated or ignored, and claimants regarded as deviants. Indeed,
when questions are posed and taken seriously involving the broad issue-"what is knowl-
edge?"-then it is a sign that a paradigm is loosening its hold on a given scientific
community.
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about paradigms in the natural sciences to the disciplines of social
science. Indeed, he contends that the social sciences operate without a
paradigm of shared perspectives, in the sense that he applies the term
to the work of physics, astronomy, biology, and chemistry.' 6 With
respect to international law, however, I think there has been a para-
digm present, certainly not as explicit as the one which has normally
guided astronomers, but nevertheless a paradigm that confines inquiry
and embodies a consensus as to the political terrain upon which in-
ternational law can fruitfully operate. By looking back at pre-modern
types of international law we can discover that the statist paradigm has
not always dominated inquiry, that a major juridical revolution in this
direction was largely accomplished by the work of Grotius and con-
solidated by Vattel.' 7 The statist paradigm has been used by the
profession to discipline deviant practitioners, mainly by labelling them
as "utopian," "legalist," or "idealist," that is, as unworthy of serious
attention because they worked outside the paradigm, or more likely,
challenged the prevailing paradigm of geopolitically conditioned in-
terstate relations."8 (Occasionally, statist deviants have also been dis-
ciplined by being called "cynics" if they went too far in denying the
role of law in world affairs.19) At the present time, in my judgment,
we are on the verge of another juridical revolution of the sort Grotius
accomplished, but this time the revolution will dethrone rather than
legitimate the statist paradigm and put in its place a framework based
on some form of central guidance.
There are several characteristics of a paradigm shift. First, it is a
16. Id. at viii.
17. E. DE VATFEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, Ap-
PLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS (J. Chitty transl. 1855).
Hedley Bull correctly notes that in this century there has been a resurgence of Grotian
thinking and a relative decline in the stature of Vattelian thinking. Professor Bull
laments this resurgence as he associates it with an immoderate or revolutionary phase
in international relations. Bull, The Grotian Conception of International Society, in
DIPLOMATIC INVESTIGATIONS 51-73 (H. Butterfield & M. Wight eds. 1966). I interpret this
resurgence of Grotian thinking more favorably, as disclosing a growing juridical sentiment
for the reform of international relations in the face of mounting evidence of the in-
ability of the statist paradigm (especially in its purer Vattelian form) to meet the main
concerns of humankind.
18. See, e.g., G. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950 (1952); H. MORGENTHAU,
DILEMMAS OF POLITICS (1958); H. MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST
(1951). For critical remarks about the influence of lawyers and legal background on the
approach of American policymakers to the foreign policy process, see H. KISSINGER,
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THREE EsSAYS 29-34 (1969). Kissinger notes, inter alia, that one
consequence of what he calls "the Anglo-Saxon tradition" is that lawyers or legally
trained individuals "prefer to deal with actual rather than hypothetical cases; they have
little confidence in the possibility of stating a future issue abstractly." Id. at 30.
19. See Louis Henkin's discussion of Dean Acheson's deprecation of the role of in-
ternational law in geopolitical crises (in that instance, the Cuban Missile Crisis). L. HENKIN,
How NATIONS BEHAVE 265-66 (1968). On the general issue of law and its limits, see id. at
251-71.
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mutation rather than a series of increments. Second, it embodies a
coherent explanation of the entire agenda of problems relevant for a
current generation of practitioners. Third, if cultural issues are in-
volved, then the paradigm shift will occur in many disparate fields of
experience, such as art, science and the humanities. 20 The idea of a
paradigm shift (or system-change) needs to be underlined because it is
particularly uncongenial to the American temperament. This concept
is especially uncongenial to American lawyers who tend to view con-
structive social change as necessarily incremental and who distrust
overall explanations of complex social and political phenomena.
But my reason for urging consideration of a new juridical paradigm
is quintessentially American: namely, that the old juridical paradigm
no longer "works," that it no longer seems responsive to the main
problems on the international agenda. Thus those who persist in
carrying on their inquiries within the old paradigm end up with
trivial results, because either they work on irrelevant problems or they
work on relevant problems with an inappropriate procedure. Of
course, so long as the old paradigm works it is sensible to take it for
granted so that we can concentrate our efforts on the frontiers of
knowledge. 21 The more we can safely take for granted, the greater pro-
portion of our time and energy we can devote to that which is not
yet adequately understood. The problem in a period of transition is
that we are no longer justified in taking very much for granted and,
therefore, we have to create a new superstructure that "works" for
the problems we seek most to solve.
To create a foundation for this line of interpretation I wish to look
back at the pre-modem paradigm that existed in medieval Europe,
and then at that twilight transition period when the old paradigm was
crumbling, but a new one had not yet definitively crystallized. Of
course one can always find antecedents, whether for scientific or
juridical revolutions, which make boundary markers appear somewhat
arbitrary. For instance, one leading interpreter of the origins of the
modem state concludes that the process by which this new organiza-
tional form came into being was completed by the year 1600, or almost
50 years before the Westphalia treaties. 22 But our concern is with the
20. See Gebser, The Foundations of the Aperspective World, 29 MAIN CURRENTS 80, 81
(1972).
21. Alfred North Whitehead has a concise formulation for this point: "It is legitimate
(as a practical counsel in a short life) to abstain from the criticism of scientific founda-
tions so long as the superstructure 'works.'" Principle of Relativity, in COLLECTED WORKS
OF ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD 300 (M. Gross & F. Northrup eds. 1953).
22. J. STRAYER, supra note 5, at 10, dates the process of statist consolidation as between
1100 and 1600. But cf. Edmund Burke's contention that "the generality of people are
fifty years, at least, behindhand in their politics." EDMUND BURKE: SELECTED WRITINGS AND
SPEEcHES 107 (P. Stanlis ed. 1963).
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state system as distinct from the medieval system, rather than with the
process by which the elements of the system were formed. Since
politics is a consensus-building compromise-oriented realm, there is a
strong tendency by actors to keep the paradigm shift implicit, even
disavowed, until long after it has been effectively accepted as con-
ventional wisdom. In the history of international law, the writings of
jurists, the great lawmaking treaties, and the contending positions (or
claims) of antagonists in the most prominent legal disputes of a given
period all manifest an ambivalence toward the contending paradigms.
Dual loyalty to the past and to that which is still to come injects an
element of incoherence in these three characteristic settings of in-
ternational law activity during any period of transition from one
world order system to another. Indeed, the existence of such inco-
herence is, perhaps, one of the strongest indications that a particular
historical period is actually undergoing transition.
A further feature of a transition period is an attitudinal shift toward
interpretations which challenge the dominant paradigm.23 While the
dominant paradigm is secure, deviant interpretations, other things
being equal, can be ignored, or virtually so, as harmless. But as evolving
events undermine the older paradigm's claim to deal adequately with
the problems within its domain, new claims based on an alternative
paradigm begin to be perceived as credible challenges. The guardians
of the status quo begin to perceive deviant interpretations as dangerous,
rather than as merely silly. In effect, previously harmless knowledge
becomes dangerous knowledge. In this vein, it is worth noting that
Grotius's treatise, undermining the medieval unity and the special
role of the Pope, was placed on the Papal Index in 1626 and was not
removed until 1899.24
In writing of the emergence of the modem statist paradigm, James
Turner Johnson notes, with special reference to the changing status
of war, that "were only the Spaniards thinking along these lines, the
new order would never have emerged; its genesis and growth derive
not only from changed historical circumstances but also from fairly
widespread efforts to think out the implications of these changed condi-
tions with the help of natural law considerations. '25 That is, threshold
phenomena such as the Grotius treatise and the Peace of Westphalia
are reflections of an emergent, widely shared, disparately formulated
23. T. KuHN, supra note 14, at 52-76.
24. A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 13, at 114, observes that Grotius's treatise was placed on
The Index "with the mitigating though practically insignificant proviso 'donec corrigatur'
(until amended)."
25. J. JOHNSON, IDEOLOGY, REASON AND TIE LIMITATION OF VAR (forthcoming 1975),
(typescript at 126).
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consensus regarding changed conditions and their juridical conse-
quences. As Professor Johnson points out, not only Grotius and his
Spanish antecedents, but a whole tradition of English speculation,
perhaps best represented in the writing of Matthew Sutcliffe2 and
William Ames,2 7 was formulating a similar set of juridical interpreta-
tions from premises set forth in the great philosophical treatises of
Hobbes and Locke.281 In other words, for a juridical revolution to
occur, there must be a convergence of interpretations based on inter-
secting perspectives drawn from the main interacting directions.20 By
the time the new juridical paradigm exists unambiguously, probably
it has largely passed already into conventional wisdom.
Let me now briefly consider the juridical paradigm shift that ac-
companied the wider historical transition from the Middle Ages to
the modem world. We are concerned here with the profound effects
on the substance and methodology of international law that can be
attributed to the emergence of a new world order system at the end
of the Middle Ages. We are concerned also with the role that jurists
and juridical events seem to have had in accelerating and shaping the
new paradigm embodied in the dynamics of the state system. My
purpose is not to achieve a new historical understanding of the origins
of modern international law, a much debated and rather unimportant
question. My purpose is rather to prepare the ground for studying the
actual and potential relevance of international law to the current
transition from the state system to some form of central guidance.
The main world order transition of the 17th century involved the
substitution of a relatively multipolar state system for the former rela-
tively unipolar imperial system bound together by the authority of the
Pope and the spiritual unity of Christendom. 0 The medieval system
was one in which papal central guidance was coordinated with feudal
loyalties to family, church, guild, and prince. The claim, as crystallized
in 1075, was one of supremacy for the Pope, "that his decision ought to
be reviewed by no one, and that he alone can review the decisions of
everyone; that he ought to be judged by no one."' 1 Joseph Strayer
26. M. SUTCLIFFE, THE PRACTICE, PROCEEDINGS AND LAW OF ARMES (1593).
27. W. AMES, CONSCIENCE WITH THE POWER AND CASES THEREOF (1643).
28. J. JOHNSON, supra note 25.
29. At the same time, a diversity of interpretations of the juridical situation is evidence
that a paradigm shift is underway and such a diversity, which generates confusion and
controversy, is characteristic of a transition period.
30. The political realities of medieval times were complicated and dominated by the
character of highly localized power arrangements. In this regard, notions of Papal
supremacy and spiritual unity were rhetorical more often than behavioral, and should
not, in any event, be accepted uncritically.
31. Articles 18-19 of Dictatus Papae Gregorii, translated in E. LEwis, MEDIEVAL POLIT-
ICAL IDEAS 381 (1954).
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also refers to the more compact formulation of Innocent III that Popes
"judged all and could be judged by no one."32 In contrast, the modern
state is characterized by spatial boundaries sustained through time, by
a set of specialized administrative institutions, and by what Strayer
calls "[t]he final, most important, and most nebulous of our tests,"
that is, "a shift in loyalty from family, local community, or religious
organization to the state and the acquisition by the state of a moral
authority to back up its institutional structure and its theoretical legal
supremacy."
33
It is the antagonism between these two sources of moral authority
that characterizes the transition period from medieval Europe to the
modern state system; and it is the eventual dominance of statist ide-
ology that marks the end of transition and the beginning of the statist
era. This antagonism was personified by the struggle between the
Papacy and Philip IV of France, who reigned over one of the earliest
political units to achieve statehood in the modem sense. The con-
troversy was provoked by Philip's efforts to tax the French clergy with-
out prior consent from Rome. The reigning Pope, Boniface VIII,
considered this an improper attempt to subject the Church to secular
control. It led to the famous papal bull Unam Sanctam in 1302 which
has been described as an effort "to sum up and define the plenitude of
the Papal power over all the Christian community, including France
and her king."34 It expressed the pure ideology of the medieval system
in its first self-conscious confrontation with paradigmatic threats from
emergent state units. Unam Sanctam staked out a claim of a once single
ascendant Church: "At the time of the flood there was, indeed, one ark
of Noah, prefiguring one Church; it... had one steersman and com-
mander, namely Noah, and we read that outside of it all things existing
on earth were destroyed." 35 From this unity springs a hierarchy of
authority, rather than two equal swords of temporal and spiritual
authority: "Spiritual power exceeds any earthly power in dignity and
nobility, as spiritual things excel temporal ones.... If, therefore, earth-
ly power err, it shall be judged by the higher, competent spiritual
power, but if the supreme spiritual power err, it could be judged
solely by God, not by man." 30 Thus, the temporal authority of a king
is derived ultimately from the same unity as the Church, but its claims
32. J. SRAYER, supra note 5, at 8 (especially note 2).
33. Id. at 9.
34. CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES 89 (S. Ehler & J. Morrall eds. &
transls. 1954). (The full text of Unamn Sanctarn appears in English at 89-91.)
35. Id. at 90.
36. Id. at 91-92.
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are subordinate to those of the Pope, who is the supreme spiritual
authority on earth.
37
It is significant that Philip's views prevailed and that he repudiated
the Papacy. But this seed of statism would take several centuries of
growth before its full flowering would occur. Perhaps the best crystal-
lizations of this changeover to the state system are not to be found until
the Peace of Westphalia, regarded as the decisive juridical event, and
Grotius's treatise The Rights of War and Peace, regarded as the deci-
sive juridical formulation.38 In both instances, the transition context
is clearly evident from the way in which the forms of the eroding order
are drawn upon so as to embellish, and perhaps disguise, the substance
of the new order. Peace treaties had been, heretofore, the decisive
juridical events in international history, because the search for an
acceptable political framework within which to manage international
conflict has been almost exclusively concerned with the problem of
war and peace. The system-changing peace treaties, a small subset, have
been those which marked major shifts in managerial conceptions, by
altering authority patterns, by staking out new roles for actors, or by
expressing a new awareness of the destructiveness of warfare and a
temporary determination to cooperate to the extent necessary to keep
the peace.
Consider the Peace of Westphalia from this perspective. It took al-
most four years to negotiate, and when finally concluded in 1648, it
formally brought the Thirty Years War to an end. The treaty carried
forward notions of territorial absolutism on matters of religious pref-
erence (at least within the Christian regional system) and removed the
issue of religious faith from the list of just causes for which a prince
might have recourse to war.39 The Church could no longer stand above
the secular fray and serve as an impartial arbiter among Christian foes,
nor could it form an alliance with the Holy Roman Emperor. Thus the
Peace of Westphalia signalled the shift in the locus of power that ac-
companied the rise of strong territorially based nation-states, acknowl-
edging the split in Christendom that led to the Reformation, and then
to the Counter-Reformation. The Thirty Years War involved a final
defeat of the effort by the Hapsburg Dynasty to reestablish the secular
and spiritual unity of pre-Reformation Europe. It thereby assured the
37. The dispute was part of the process that led to the temporary shift of the seat of
the papacy to Avignon.
38. A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 13, at 112-14, 115. See H. GROTIUS, supra note 13.
39. The principles of religious tolerance had already been anticipated in 1555 in the
Peace of Augsburg. Id. at 116. But this anticipation was on an intra-German, rather
than at an international, level.
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decentralization of power and authority which has become one major
attribute of the state system. Recall our earlier contention that harm-
less knowledge turns to dangerous knowledge as the hour of paradigm
shift approaches; it is revealing that Pope Innocent X condemned the
provisions on religious tolerance, the very core of the Peace of West-
phalia, as "null, void, invalid, wicked, unjust, condemned, reprobated,
futile, and without strength and effect" in the Papal Bull Zelo domus
Dei of November 20, 1648.40 The Bull even purported to nullify the
oaths made to carry out the treaty; significantly, the treaty was carried
out in all its parts, and the papal intervention seemed to exert no
influence even on the Catholic rulers who had signed the treaties at
Munster and Osnabriick. Nussbaum aptly notes: "Just as there is a
spiritual nexus between Grotius's work and the Peace of Westphalia,
so there is a similar nexus between the papal condemnations of
Grotius's work and of this Peace." 41 And so those who are the bearers
of a new paradigm for international legal studies can expect similar
harsh treatment.
The military outcome of the final phases of the Thirty Years War
also reflected the rise of secularized geopolitics, as Catholic Bavaria
allied with Lutheran Sweden to oppose the Hapsburgs while the French
Catholic monarchy supported the essentially Protestant effort to halt
the Counter-Reformation. Thus, a perceived need to check secular
ambitions was a significant element of the pre-Westphalia alliance
system, notwithstanding the prevailing rhetoric by which the partici-
pants insisted on emphasizing the religious stakes of the conflict. Put
differently, Catholic France would undoubtedly have preferred to see
Catholicism restored throughout Europe, but not at the cost of making
the Hapsburg Empire the dominant actor in Europe. Rather than
acquiesce in such a disadvantagous geopolitical situation, France was
prepared to help the anti-Catholic cause prevail in the Thirty Years
War. The principal loser in the Thirty Years War was the loosely
confederated German empire.42 After Westphalia, it was France that
emerged as the most powerful actor, mounting expansionist drives in
subsequent periods to achieve hegemony over the whole of Europe,
first under the aegis of Louis XIV and later under Napoleon. These
efforts resulted in the two most important peace treaties after 1648-
40. CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES, supra note 34, at 196. (The entire text
of the Bull appears at 193-98.)
41. Id. at 116.
42. "Culturally and economically the war had thrown Germany back more than a
century. She had lost one-third of her population according to conservative estimates. To
this the Peace added the irretrievable paralysis to the Empire's political might." A.
NUSSBAUM, supra note 13, at 116.
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the Peace of Utrecht (1713) and the Peace of Paris (1814, 1815),
related to the Congress of Vienna. These treaties manifest a second
attribute of the state system, the increasingly self-conscious use of al-
liance relationships to sustain the multipolarity of the world order
system and to contain revolutionary actors who seek a large-scale
revision in basic geopolitical relationships.
At Westphalia there was a realization that in some national societies
there were domestic religious differences, and that unless these dif-
ferences were tolerated they would cause civil strife and generate pre-
texts for intervention by outsiders. Therefore, the treaty protected the
religious conscience of individuals while reinforcing the new peace
framework of sovereign states; it thereby also expressed the philosophy
of natural rights underlying the contemporary development of an in-
ternational law of human rights.4 3 In the setting of the 17th century
this right of personal choice, accompanied by an ethics of toleration,
reflected the growing influence of an individualistic ethos which had
many roots, ranging from the rise of capitalism to the whole notion
of enlightenment and individualism associated with the Renaissance,
and extending to the Luther-led revolt on behalf of conscience against
the arbitrary authority of the Church.44
Thus Westphalia embodies one of those "omnipresent comple-
mentarities," as Professor McDougal calls them, in the prevailing inter-
national legal order 4 -on the one side, matters of religion are con-
fined to domestic jurisdiction; on the other, abridgments of religious
freedom are made matters of international concern. The tension be-
tween domestic jurisdiction and human rights is as old as the persecu-
tions of the Huguenots or Puritans and as contemporary as the persecu-
tion of Soviet Jewry. It remains necessarily ambiguous in each context
whether deference to state sovereignty should take precedence over
efforts to rescue victims of governmental abuse.
Here, then, are the major elements of the modern state system pre-
figured in the Peace of Westphalia, although rendered somewhat
murky in its express language by the residual deference to and reliance
upon the outmoded system that was being supplanted. It is this ex-
43. This concern with the individual or group is an alien element in a purely statist
conception of international society. It is like a dormant bacteria that waits for the
organism to weaken before it mounts an attack. The natural rights feature is significant
because it underscores the inalienable character of fundamental human rights, thereby
assuring their legal status independent of expressions of consent by governments. See note
56 infra.
44. This revolt, although triumphant in a politically conservative form, is one of the
most significant elements of revolutionary energy present in the Protestant movement as
a whole.
45. McDougal, The Ethics of Applying Systems of Authority: The Balanced Opposites
of a Legal System, in THE Emic or PowER 221, 222 (H. Lasswell & H. Cleveland eds. 1962).
984
Vol. 84: 969, 1975
A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies
hibition of transitional intersystemic confusion that is especially
interesting for our purposes. First of all, the secularization of interna-
tional politics is disguised by the adoption of a highly religious rhetoric
characteristic of a much earlier mood. The use of this rhetoric may
have expressed a measure of nostalgia, and it may indicate a perfectly
reasonable attempt to use the shared Christianity of the opposing
leaders as a normative common ground above their ecclesiastical divi-
sions. Article I of the Treaty of Westphalia (Munster) expresses this
tone:
[T]here shall be a Christian and Universal Peace, and a perpetual,
true, and sincere amity, between his Imperial Majesty and his most
Christian Majesty.46
There are also numerous indications of the residual role of feudal
arrangements even at the level of intergovernmental compacts. Indeed,
the older feudal paradigm provided a ready-made means of implement-
ing the conflict's main geopolitical outcome, the defeat and frustration
of the Hapsburg design to extend the sway of the Holy Roman Empire
over the numerous Germanic principalities. The Peace of Westphalia
conferred autonomous international status on the more than 300 mem-
bers of the Holy Roman Empire; they were given the legal capacity to
enter alliances with foreign governments and to wage war, provided
only that the alliances were not directed at the Empire or against the
terms of the Peace of Westphalia. These subordinate units of empire
"were thereby lifted to an international legal status approximating
sovereignty though the old term Landeshoheit (territorial supremacy)
was preserved." 47 Here, too, we note ironically another characteristic
46. 1 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 9 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
MAJOR PEACE TREATIES]. (The entire Westphalia text appears at 7-49.)
47. A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 13, at 116. Even the language of the treaties is replete
with feudal terminology; for instance, in the general amnesty provision, Article VI, we
note references to "their Lordships, their fiefs, Underfiefs, Allodations" and to their
"Dignities, Immunities, Rights, and Privileges." 1 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES, supra note 46,
at 11. In confirming French royal sovereignty over towns in Alsatia and Sungtau Article
LXXVI refers to "all the Vassals, Subjects, Peoples, Towns, Boroughs, Castles...." Id.
at 31.
In the Westphalia Treaty there is an acknowledgment not only that national govern-
ments are the main participants in the new world order system, but also that such
governments are not the only participants. This view contrasts to that of the late 19th
and early 20th century, a view that is itself now coming under some pressure. The view
that governments of states are the only participants finds its way into some of the most
influential earlier definitions of international law. See generally W. BISHOP, JR., INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 3-6 (2d ed. 1962). For a much wider appreciation of the participants in
the world order, see McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of
Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL ED. 253, 261-75 (1967). The Munster variant of West-
phalia included a long list of feudal allies of both principal signatories-The Holy Roman
Emperor and the King of France-many of whom achieved great international status even
though they could not qualify as states.
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feature of the state system: the primacy of geopolitics, especially the
persisting effort by major governments to prevent any one of their
number from achieving continental hegemony.
The closing articles of the treaty include some forward looking
provisions involving an innovative effort to establish an agreed frame-
work of restraint vis-a-vis recourse to war. For one thing, an effort is
made to affirm the primacy of the peace obligation, even in the event
that some aspect of the elaborate plan of "Restitution and Reparation"
is not put into effect: "[A]Il Parties in this Transaction shall be obliged
to defend and protect all and every Article of this Peace against any
one, without distinction of Religion.""8 Even more impressive are the
seeds of modern notions of peaceful settlement and provisions of an
ambitious implementing procedure:
[A]nd if it happens any point shall be violated, the Offended shall
before all things exhort the Offender not to come to any Hostility,
submitting the Cause to a friendly Composition, or the ordinary
Proceedings of Justice.
49
Finally, the treaty contains a notion of collective security based on
helping the victim of abuse, provided that victim has waited three years
to allow settlement to come about by peaceful means.
[I]f for the space of three years the Difference cannot be termi-
nated by any of those means, all and every one of those concem'd
in this Transaction shall be oblig'd to join the injur'd Party, and
assist him with Counsel and Force to repel the Injury, being first
advertis'd by the injur'd that gentle Means and Justice prevail'd
nothing .... 50
The treaty also seeks to identify the "infringer of the Peace," what in
modem parlance we call "the aggressor," as that party which first de-
parts from the peaceful processes of settlement ("the means of ordinary
justice"). 51
Embedded in this threshold juridical event at Westphalia is a con-
stitutional effort to lay down ground rules for a new status of war: at
this point of transition the peace treaty became a legislative document
seeking to prevent reversion to destructive warfare by taking account of
48. Article CXXIII, 1 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES, supra note 46, at 46.
49. Article CXXIII, id.
50. Article CXXIV, id. at 47.
51. Id.
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"the new realities." My point here is that Grotius (and other jurists of
the time) helped to formulate reformist notions on the status of war
that were then translated by statesmen into a juridical formula that
could be put into treaty form. International law also performed a
critical role in providing a normative bridge between the spiritualist
pretensions of the Middle Ages and the statist pretensions of the
modem era.
Just as critics were unmasking the pious frauds perpetrated under
the aegis of Church-centered normative guidance, ideologists of the
state system were working out notions of absolute prerogative at the
national level-often, as in the case of Bodin, so as to legitimate claims
of domestic sovereignty on behalf of national governments that were
opposed by feudal loyalists.52 The danger, of course, was that the
collapse of Christian unity would produce a normative vacuum in
which there were no shared guidelines of restraint. International
lawyers provided an intricate set of procedures by which to uphold and
maintain these shared guidelines in the new secular context, thereby
moderating the abiding impulse toward amorality in interstate rela-
tions.
This contribution of international law and lawyers is easy to under-
estimate, especially as public attention tends to fasten on the spectac-
ular struggles of the day in which all forms of constraint give way. But
for recurrent and normal interactions among governments, and even
for classes of interactions among antagonistic or warring governments,
international law has provided a normative framework of immense
practical value. This framework has been a constant buffer against
more absolutist approaches to state behavior, and has refuted those
simplistic assertions that rest the whole of international relations on
considerations of relative military power. Thus, the role of the great
international jurists in the Westphalian period was to add a beneficial
normative element to the historical drift toward a statist option in in-
ternational life. To be creative, in other words, required both an
understanding of this historical drift, and an effort to exert an in-
fluence upon it.
The perspectives prefigured in Grotius and Westphalia became
much more explicit in the Peace of Utrecht (1713) and in the prin-
52. Jean Bodin's principal work, THE Six BooKEs OF A COMMONWEALE (K. McRae ed.
1962), originally appeared in France in 1579. On the evolution and nature of sovereignty
in the state system, see E. CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE (1964); F. MEINECKE,
MACHIAVELLISM (D. Scott transl. 1957); R. STERLING, ETHICS IN A WORLD OF POWER: THE
POLITICAL IDEAS OF FRIEDRICH MEINECKE (1958).
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cipal treatise of Emmerich de Vattel.53 The main contractual under-
taking at Utrecht was to formalize the frustration of Louis XIV's
effort to extend French control to Spain in the War of Spanish Suc-
cession (1702-1713). In the treaty this result was expressed in the form
of reciprocal renunciations by the French and Spanish kings of each
other's thrones.54 What is more significant from our point of view is
the more explicit emergence of the statist paradigm. First, territorial
states are the prime actors; semi-territorial actors like the Holy Roman
Empire or nonterritorial actors like the Pope have virtually no status.
Second, geopolitics is explicitly acknowledged as an element of the
international legal order. It is the means to sustain the multistate con-
text, resist hegemony, and preserve balance; thus natural law perspec-
tives on the status of war give way to balance of power perspectives.
Third, governments are agents of their populations and spokesmen for
their well-being; they exercise "that paternal Care which they delight
to use towards their own subjects."' 5
The geopolitical nexus of international relations is worthy of closer
scrutiny. In several places, the idea that peace depends on geopolitical
equilibrium is not only affirmed, but is practically elevated to a
principle of natural law.56 In the Spanish king's renunciation of any
claims on the French crown we find this phrasing:
[I]t being to be believed, that by this perpetual and neverceasing
Hope, the Needle of the Ballance may remain invariable, and all
the Powers, wearied with the Toil and Uncertainty of Battles, may
be amicably kept in an equal Poise; it not remaining in the Dis-
posal of any of the Partys to alter this federal Equilibrium by way
53. See note 17 supra.
54. 1 MAJOR PEACE TR.ATiEs, supra note 46, at 118 (describes major aspects of war).
55. Preamble to the Peace of Utrecht, id. at 177. "The Welfare of a People so faithful,
is to us a supreme Law, which ought to be preferred to any other Consideration. It is to
this Law that We this day sacrifice the Right of a Grandson, who is so dear to us; and
by the Price which the general Peace will cost our tender Love, we shall at least have the
Comfort of shewing our Subjects, that even at the Expence of our Blood, they will always
keep the first place in our Heart." Renunciation of Spain to the Crown of France, Peace
of Utrecht, id. at 184.
56. By "natural law" I mean that jurisprudential tradition which derives the authority
of law and its fundamental content from sources of objective authority independent of
human will. Among the varieties of natural law are those that rest their claim upon
revelation by God, the dictates of reason, or the character of nature itself. What these
diverse schools of natural law have in common is the assertion of a criterion of legality
that takes precedence over any assertion by a particular person or any interpretation of
an historical situation. Natural law is often set off against legal positivism, in which
principal stress is placed upon deriving the authority and content of law from the consent
of the sovereign or the operations of formal lawmaking procedures. See A. D'ENTRV.S,
NATURAL LAw (2d ed. rev. 1970).
Note that even at Utrecht the unity of Christendom remains an element in the settle-
ment of conflict; parallel to this the relationship between the Christian and non-Christian
world becomes an increasingly critical ethical and legal issue.
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of any Contract of Renunciation, or Retrocession; since the same
Reason which induced its being admitted, demonstrates its Per-
manency, a fundamental Constitution being formed, which may
settle by an unalterable Law the Succession of what is to come57
Note here that solicitude toward subjects is given as a principal reason
for preferring peace to a frequent assertion of unresolved dynastic
claims, and that the permanent renunciation of such claims is intended
to reinforce the equilibrium among the great powers, thereby dis-
couraging renewal of war. International law provides governments
with an authoritative instrument by which to solemnize such under-
takings and to express the basis of peaceful relations in a definitive
form that diminishes any prospect of future miscalculation. In another
ancillary way, international law separates private grievances from
public wrongs so as to provide remedies of a limited nature that do
not threaten resumption of warfare. Thus, in Article XVIII it is agreed
that if any subject of the contracting parties acts in a manner incom-
patible with the peace agreed upon, it shall not disrupt intergovern-
mental arrangements; "that Subject alone.., shall suffer the Punish-
ment, which is inflicted by the Rules and Directions of the Law of
Nations.""8
The Peace of Utrecht manifests the full logical coherence of the new
paradigm. The Christian bonds are still stressed, but not in an integral
manner. Peace is sustained by geopolitical equilibrium, which requires
two main things: first, secure boundaries and lines of dynastic suc-
cession; second, a realization that any attempt by a major power to
57. 1 MAJOR PEACE TREAIES, supra note 46, at 187-88. The Declaration of Philip,
Duke of Orleans, expresses a similar sentiment: "[flt was necessary to establish a kind of
Equality and Equilibrium between the Princes who were in dispute [regarding the
prospect of Hapsburg succession to the Spanish Crown] .... [T]his house itself, without
the Union of the Empire, would become formidable, if it should add a new Power to its
ancient Dominions; and consequently this Equilibrium, which is designed to be estab-
lished for the good of the Princes and States of Europe, would cease. Now it is certain
that without this Equilibrium, either the States suffer from the Weight of their own
Greatness, or envy engages their Neighbors to make Alliances to attack them, and to
reduce them to such a point, that the great Powers may inspire less Fear, and may not
aspire to an universal Monarchy." Id. at 199-200. This statement resolves Spanish succes-
sion in an indisputable fashion, confirming the Spanish claimant, and renouncing the
prospect of the French claimant. Charles of France made a comparable statement: "It
has been agreed... to establish an Equilibrium, and political Boundarys between the
Kingdoms, whereof the Interests have been, and are still the sad occasion of a bloody
Dispute; and to hold it for a fundamental Maxim, in order to preserve this Peace, that
Provision ought to be made, that the Forces of these Kingdoms may not become formi-
dable, nor be able to cause any Jealousy; which it has been thought, cannot be settled
more solidly than by hindering them from extending themselves, and by keeping a certain
Proportion; to the end that the weaker being united together may defend themselves
against the more powerful, and support themselves respectively against their Equals." Id.
at 195-96. (The entire text of the Peace of Utrecht appears at 177-239.)
58. Id. at 187-88.
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increase its relative position in the system will set in motion a complex
of forces that could eventuate in a defensive alliance and warfare.
The juridical consequences of the Westphalia-Utrecht line of devel-
opment are carefully and conveniently explicated by Vattel in his Law
of Nations, initially published in 1758. Unlike Grotius, who combines
nostalgia for the earlier medieval approach with aspirations for a
future order based on higher morality, Vattel does not challenge the
prevailing consensus. His work reflects rather than reforms or chal-
lenges. As such, it is generally acceptable to decisionmakers at all levels
of the political order and, as might be expected, is more influential
than other intellectually superior juridical statements., 9
In my view, Vattel's stature was a direct consequence of his capacity
to codify the status paradigm in clear prose. He was praised for his
"common sense" and "realism," 60 but such praise only meant that he
was a faithful repository of conventional wisdom. With the erosion of
the Westphalia paradigm in the 20th century, especially in the period
since 1914, there has been a gradual disappearance of the Vattelian
consensus on the contents of "common sense," as well as a neo-Grotian
movement of sorts. Hedley Bull describes "the Grotian conception," a
conception he incidentally deplores, as "a certain conception of in-
ternational society, whose imprint may be traced in the Covenant of
the League of Nations, the Paris Pact, the United Nations Charter,
and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nurem-
berg." 1 These agreements which prefigure neo-Grotian thought call
to mind Grotius's own effort to substitute a community of nations
resting on natural law norms for the collapsing Christian community
59. A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 13, at 160, notes, "Among the legal learned Vattel has
never met with much praise." Jeremy Bentham's famous summary of Vattelian reasoning
is somewhat, but not entirely unfair: "It is not just to do what is unjust." Nevertheless.
Vattel's influence was without serious peer. Edwin Dickinson's study of the relative in-
fluence of continental international lawyers during the period from 1789 to 1820 is
revealing:
Citations in Court Court
Pleadings Citations Quotations
Grotius 16 11 2
Pufendorf 9 4 8
Bynkershoek 25 16 2
Vattel 92 38 22
Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, .259 n.13g
(1932), cited and commented on by A. NUSSBAUM, supra, at 162. See also the fuller depic-
tion of Grotian ideas in Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, [1946]
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1.
60. See A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 13, at 161-63.
61. Bull, supra note 17, at 50. Professor Bull refers to H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950) and to C. JENKs, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND (1958)
as further evidence of the revival of Grotian thinking.
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which had rested uneasily on ecclesiastic authority and religious
tradition.
In my terminology, Grotius endeavored to recreate a plausible
ideology of central guidance in a situation of increasing disintegration.
As long as the historical drift was against him, that is, in the period
between Utrecht and World War I, the more statist jurisprudence of
Vattel carried the day because it seemed to correspond more closely
with configurations of belief, power, and behavior. As 20th century
students of the statist paradigm began to uncover anomalies, principally
in the form of mutually destructive warfare and of multidimensional
interdependence, a swing back toward Grotian conceptions could be
discerned both in the work of "far-seeing guides"0 2 and even in the
characteristic juridical reforms of the time. 3 Instead of a normative
hope, central guidance of a secular sort became a public demand as
well as an objective sought after by practical men of affairs.64
The time horizons of such a quest encourage misinterpretations,
especially by those with little feeling for the rhythm of major historical
transformations. There is a tendency either to expect the process to
crystallize almost immediately in a world government or conversely
to dismiss as irrelevant these early gropings toward central guidance
because they have no prospect of taking definitive shape in the near
future.6 Confusion is also generated by contradictions among con-
current trends, and unless attempts are made to interpret the overall
process, there is a tendency to believe that everything is cancelled out.
For instance, for every move toward central guidance it is possible to
point to a neutralizing move toward sovereign prerogative, whether
it be the proliferation of the state system in this post-colonial period or
62. E.g., W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (1964); C.
JENKS, supra note 61; H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 61; H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION
OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933).
63. These include the constitutional documents of international organizations, espe-
cially the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations, the
Nuremberg Judgment and the later formulation of its conclusions in a document called
the Nuremberg Principles, and the main developments in the international law of human
rights. For the texts of the United Nations Charter and principal human rights develop-
ments, see BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-31, 144-232 (I. Brownlie ed. 2d
rev. ed. 1972). For a convenient text of the Nuremberg- Judgment and Principles, see
CRIMES OF WAR 88-108 (R. Falk, G. Kolko & R. Lifton eds. 1971).
64. The enthusiasm for central guidance in the period after World War I, and sub-
sequent disillusionment, is well-documented in W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 62, at 275-76.
65. Professor Friedmann provides a characteristic, if restrained, dismissal of central
guidance when he concludes that its proponents "ignore the basic social factors of inter-
national society." Id. at 276. In the slightly altered context of the basis for a universal
system of international law, see the critique of this "make-believe" or "spurious uni-
versalism" in McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems
of Public Order, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959), reprinted in M. McDOUGAL &- ASSociATES,
STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 3 (1960).
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the upsurge of statist approaches to the control of the oceans,'" until
recently the virtual commons of mankind.
My plea is that we take an historical perspective which can accept
the fact that a process of paradigm shift may take place over a period
of centuries, and that we grow sensitive to the pull and push of forces
in the international legal system without losing sight of the cumula-
tive drift toward central guidance. What is "realistic" has happily be-
come a matter of controversy, and objective conditions have changed
in ways that alter the notion of "equilibrium," the status of war, the
prospects for peace and tranquility, and the role and capacities of
territorial actors. Today, as in the 17th century, the time is ripe for
preliminary efforts to give juridical shape to a new paradigm of global
relations, one that corresponds more closely than statist thinking to
the needs, trends, and values of the present state of global politics. The
seeds of the new paradigm were planted long ago, most emphatically
by the experiences of widespread disillusionment with the balance of
power, but only recently has it become plausible to conceive of their
presence as the basis for a new paradigm. It is this possibility that will
be the subject of the discussion below.
In a sense my analysis reduces to a plea directed at the international
legal profession. It is a normative plea that challenges the implicit con-
servatism of statism and mocks the pseudo-realism of those who, in a
period of transition, make the pursuit of stability their primary goal.
It is a plea for international lawyers to stop acting as if their most
important task were to clarify the rights and duties of the various
passengers on the planetary cruiseship Titanic. It is basically a plea
to join forces with an infant movement for global reform, but without
any illusion that a "quick fix" can be achieved. Indeed, it is a plea to
pursue a set of goals that seems hopeless if we consider the array of
forces on the other side. It is a plea to make the right choice regardless
of the odds, and just because one cares about the future of the human
species and the planet earth.
66. I refer here to the extension of state sovereignty over ocean activity formerly
regarded as part of the high seas and thus, by legal right, open to all on an equal basis.
Given the need to replace the historic regime of "freedom," it could have been possible
to allocate regulatory authority to the world community or regional subcommunities
rather than to allocate the bulk of authority over the most valuable activities among
coastal states. The efforts under United Nations auspices to evolve a new law of the seas
started with an idealistic vision of the oceans as "the common heritage of mankind" and
ended with an extension of sovereignty achieved mainly at the expense of an earlier
domain of community prerogatives. See THE LAW OF THE SEA (Proc. of Ann. Confs. of the
Law of the Sea Institute, L. Alexander ed. 1966-1973).
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II
How, then, can we encourage the development of an appropriate
paradigm for international legal studies? Given my analysis, a paradigm
will not be appropriate unless it is responsive to the design require-
ments for guided transition. Such requirements include, above all else,
efforts to depict the general direction of the transitional shift already
underway, the array of plausible options, criteria for choice among the
options, and an action plan by which to maximize the possibilities
through which the preferred option could become the probable op-
tion. On this basis a new paradigm might be part of a wider effort
to resist transition pressures likely to produce a world order solution
that is undesirable in terms of either the well-being and development
of the human species, or the ecological stability of the planet.67 My
ideas are based upon the new juridical paradigm that has been evolv-
ing under the auspices of Professors Myres McDougal and Harold Lass-
well and their numerous co-workers. 68 What I believe is needed is to
refocus the McDougal enterprise on the specific challenges posed by
a transitional context.
Barrington Moore, Jr., has urged reform-minded individuals to
compare the costs and risks of reform with those of passivity and recon-
ciliation. Moore realizes that such a comparison "can never be more
than a rough approximation."0' 9 But only with it, he says, "can we
avoid succumbing to the defeatist illusion of impotence within a per-
manent present or the opposite one of romantic utopianism. 70 Moore
regards these two illusions as themselves "sources of human misery"
and argues that "the effort to overcome them.., is indeed the central
justification for the role of the detached observer of human affairs." 71
What Moore emphasizes is similar to what Vinogradoff had in mind
when he referred to the role of "far-seeing guides" in reshaping the
character of international legal studies. It is what I should emphasize
as critical at the present juncture if we are to grapple in earnest with
67. The ethical foundations of such a new paradigm are beginning to be developed.
See G. HARDIN, EXPLORING NEW ETHICS FOR SURVIVAL: THE VOYAGE OF THE SPACESHIP
BEAGLE (1972); V. POTTER, BIOEtHICS: BRIDGE TO THE FuTURE (1971).
68. For representative formulations of Professor McDougal's approach, see M. Mc-
DOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961); Suzuki, The
New Haven School of International Law: An Invitation to A Policy-Oriented Juris-
prudence, 1 YALE STUD. IN WORLD PUB. ORD. 1 (1974); McDougal, Jurisprudence for a
Free Society, 1 GA. L. REv. 1 (1966). For assessment and analysis by a sympathetic
scholar, see J. MooRE, LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR 47-76 (1972).
69. B. MOORE, JR., REFLECTIONS ON THE CAUSES OF HUMAN MISERY AND UPON CERTAIN
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the twin dangers of cynical realism, which overadjusts to the inade-
quacies of the existing order, and utopian idealism, which is so un-
mindful of existing constraints on reform that it can be of no practical
relevance. Both are static postures that fail to comprehend an histor-
ically constrained transition process that seems to throw light upon the
most relevant range of options.
It is the notion of historical constraint that brings into focus my
analysis of the present world order situation. Such a notion does make
certain assumptions: for instance, it excludes the occurrence of man-
made or natural catastrophe; it excludes an invasion from outer space;
it excludes discoveries that enable the whole world population to enjoy
affluence and abundance despite the persistence of wide disparities.
In other words, I accept a developmental view of the transition process
that is neither beset nor alleviated by a deus ex machina. At the same
time I do not feel that human capacities for response must be confined
to marginal adjustment. Changes in possibilities need to be understood
as mutations rather than increments. The whole image of paradigm
change implies an abrupt discontinuity; the work of Jean Gebser in
studying the evolution of human consciousness is highly relevant be-
cause he so clearly associates modes of thought with particular con-
ceptions of space prevalent at a given time. Gebser shows that to deal
with the pressures of the contemporary world a holistic way of thinking
needs to be developed, and argues convincingly that such a mode is
already immanent in consciousness. It is a matter of actualizing, rather
than inventing it.72 The first phase in an explicit Transition73 strategy
is to reshape consciousness in a holistic direction that derives inspira-
tion from an ethical position of human solidarity in a context of
material scarcity.74 My presentation of the crisis in world order is sum-
marized in Diagram I.
Before we can deal directly with paradigm redesign, some funda-
mental questions of basic approach need to be discussed. It is important
to draw the distinction between adopting a new orientation toward
global reform (what I am calling paradigm redesign) and the process
of actual reform. The design of the new paradigm is possible im-
mediately and it is also a step in the direction of reform, but the
dynamics of reform will be the work of the next several generations.
72. See Gebser, supra note 20; Gebser, The Integral Consciousness, 30 MAIN CURRENTS
107-08 (1973). Professor Gebser's principal work, URSPRUNG UND GEGENWAIRT (2 vols. 1966),
remains untranslated.
73. In the diagram, "t" (transition) is the historical process of drift from the state
system in the direction of some new globalist system of world order, whereas "T" (Transi-
tion) is the study of explicit ideas about facilitating the realization of a given program
for global reform.
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First, there is the age-old issue of freedom and constraint. I am
arguing that the flow of historical forces restricts the plausible array
of world order options in rather specific ways. The limits of plausibility
are set by the requirements for effective mechanisms of nonterritorial
central guidance. The possibilities for creative human intervention
depend on a prior understanding of the historical context. I am taking
a position that denies both historical closure and indefinite openness.
Second, there is the ongoing debate between the tough-minded and
tender-hearted over who occupies the high ground of "reality." The
literature of international law and relations poses a false dichotomy
between Machiavellian geopolitics (the realm of Henry Kissinger) and
the globaloney of schemes for instant world government. As I have
argued, the balance of power approach to world order is increasingly
incapable of satisfying the needs of principal governments or their most
powerful constituencies, whereas a utopian fantasy of world govern-
ment is unconnected with any plausible transition scenario.7 4 It is true,
as a recent letter to the New York Times declares, that "no utopian
thinking disregarding the realities of the world scene can move us an
inch beyond the balance of power. It can only aggravate the calamities
of an imperfect world." 75 So conceived, the only rational course of
behavior is to learn the ropes on the Kissingerian ship of state; any
more drastic strategy is repudiated as "utopian." This falsely-posited
dichotomy provides the prevailing paradigm with a means to discipline
deviants, or at least, to label them as harmless oddities.7 6 In a sense,
advocates of instant world government reinforce the statist paradigm
by discrediting any movement for drastic reform. I think legalists and
other utopians encourage a re-embrace of the status quo; people
commonly react that if fantasy is the alternative to reality, then let's
give the devil his due and work with reality.
But apologists for each of these positions are placing their bets on
horses that have already lost the race. Both Machiavellian geopolitics
and utopian legalism are nonviable world order options because they
74. R. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR HUMAN SURVIVAL
215-45 (1971), develops such a position. See also R. FALK, supra note 6, at 277-439.
75. Borsody, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1973, at 22, col. 5; for a full
and eloquent defense of balance of power thinking, as adapted to an ideological interpre-
tation of global conflict, see E. RosTow, PEACE IN THE BALANCE (1972). Even idealistic
thinkers lend their authority to the attitudes Borsody expressed. See, e.g., W. FRIEDMANN,
INTRODUCTION TO WORLD POLITICS (5th ed. 1965).
76. For perceptive critiques of reformist thinking from the perspective of the statist
paradigm, see F. HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE (1963); W. SCHIFFER, THE
LEGAL COMMUNITY OF MANKIND (1954). For advocacy of world government as the sole
alternative to the anarchy and warfare of the state system, see A. HOLCOMBE, A STRATEGY
OF PEACE IN A CIANGING VORLD (1967); E. REvFs, THE ANATOMY OF PEACE (1946).
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fail to perceive the dominant integrationist thrust of contemporary
issues. At the same time both positions can be usefully associated with
an apt appreciation of prospects for global reform. The intelligent.ap-
preciation of the dynamics of geopolitics does moderate the potential
for conflict during a period of consciousness-raising that is just now
seriously getting underway. We need an interim period of Kissingerian
geopolitics as a "minor premise," to avoid a breakdown of the state
system prior to the formation of a widely shared understanding of
the prospects for nonterritorial central guidance and of the array of
plausible options. Furthermore, we require utopian models of global
reform to structure our awareness, provided we appreciate both their
failure to provide a transition strategy and their metaphorical
provincialism. 77
There is another spurious issue that must be considered. This is the
frequent claim that only a catastrophe could bring about a transforma-
tion of the world order system. 78 Here, the argument concedes that
central guidance is likely to come, but not until after another world
war. Indeed, among self-styled realists we can identify an optimist as
one who believes that the war system can be eliminated from human
experience by world order reforms put into practice after World War
III; a pessimist believes we may have to wait until after World War
IV, or longer. But perhaps we are interpreting the global setting with-
out taking a close enough look at some of its distinctive features. It is,
of course, significantly chastening to notice that the main world order
adjustments have in the past taken place after wars, as adjuncts to
major peace settlements. But is this sequence of response inevitable?
Are there reasons to suppose that pre-catastrophe prospects for world
order mutations are improving?
I believe that various pressures in addition to the menace of general
warfare are now propelling the human species toward a new threshold
of choice with respect to fundamental issues of social organization for
security and well-being. Many major governments in our age believe
77. For example, the Clark-Sohn model must be understood as an American fantasy
that should be perceived as, at most, a particular cultural hypothesis about global reform
that must be related to parallel fantasies drawn from the utopias depicted in other
world cultures. G. CLARK & L. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW (3d ed. 1966).
See AWARE OF UTOPIA (D. Platch ed. 1971); THE QUEsT FOR UTOPIA (C. Negley & J. Patrick
eds. 1952); UTOPIA (G. Kateb ed. 1971). It is notable that even Aristotle in The Politics
proposed the study of ideal states as well as real ones. THE POLITICS 80-107 (B. Jowett
transl. 1943).
78. For a scenario based on post-catastrophe global reform, see Bundy, After the
Deluge, the Covenant, SATURDAY REV./WORLD, Aug. 24, 1974, at 14. A. WEBRE & P. LISS,
THE AGE OF CATACLYSM 153-97 (1974), examine the general case for imminent catastrophe
as politically regenerative, but base the prospect for a new world order system on their
anticipation of natural (rather than man-made) catastrophe.
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that general warfare would be both mutually destructive and politically
inconclusive, i.e., that the damage would be awesome and there would
be no winner who could dictate the terms of peace and reconstruction.
Indeed, the main military conflicts since Hiroshima, those fought on
center stage in the geopolitical arena, have all ended as stalemates.
7
9
The future synapses of transition are not so likely to be post-war
rehabilitation, but rather the emergent necessity of governments to
strike world order bargains concerning subject matter that is global in
scope and nonterritorial in essential character. The prime world order
imperative is no longer prudential or redemptive, in the historical
sense of liberating world society from what the Preamble of the United
Nations Charter calls "the scourge of war." Rather, it is ecological, in
the broadest sense of interdependence amid scarcity. An overwhelming
list of issues makes this perspective inevitable and inescapable: the
drive to evolve a world energy and monetary framework and to
negotiate a new ocean regime; the challenge of space age technologies
relating to such crucial matters as the transmission of information,
modification of climate and weather, and the identification of earth
resources; the prevalence and potency of private armies; the trans-
nationalization of terrorism; the deteriorating world food situation; the
mobility of ideas, people, things; and the universality of holistic
imagery of the earth-the Apollo vision of the planet in space on which
state boundaries are no more natural than the mapmakers' lines of
latitude and longitude.
The issue of timing is fundamental and bewildering. I believe that
a paradigm shift is both necessary and possible in the years ahead, and
that such a shift would help to influence the transition process in the
direction of preferred world order options. Nevertheless, the duration
of the transition process cannot be anticipated with any confidence. It
might be as short as a few decades or as long as several centuries.
In sum, I see a buildup of largely peacetime pressures to adopt a
central guidance option. It is true that the war system remains implicit
in the restructuring process and will doubtless play a role that is likely
to distort priorities during the transition period. However, the war
system's role is one of influencing the shape of the central guidance
option, rather than determining whether or not the transition will
ever be made. As matters now stand, the prospects are for what I would
79. The 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 "wars" in the Middle East can be regarded as
phases in a continuous war to resolve the status and domain of Israel; the Indo-Pakistan
War of 1971 seems like an exception to the proposition in the text because it ended in
an all-out Indian victory. But it was not a major war in a geopolitical sense because the
nuclear superpowers were not arrayed in a serious way on opposing sides. Moreover, the
main stake of the conflict was to encourage a secessionist effort within Pakistan.
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regard as a regressive form of central guidance, i.e., a reorganization of
political relations based on the ability of the few to dominate and
manipulate the many who exist in conditions of outrageous and un-
necessary misery. Can we change this prospect? Can international law
help to alter the present relation of forces now arrayed in support of
regressive transition strategies?
III
At this point I want to clarify what I mean by world order options
during this period of transition, by considering the prospect of system
change from four perspectives, each of which in my opinion is alert to
the possibility in the decades ahead. The perspectives are utopian
legalism, the new geopolitics of great powership, the new geoeconomics
of the multinational corporate elite, and a global populism based on
human solidarity. I believe the utopian legalist perspective need con-
cern us the least, because it lacks both a credible transition scenario and
structural leverage. The next two perspectives are far more relevant to
the process and prospects of system change. They serve as examples of
the kind of reformist initiatives that are potent, because they possess
structural leverage, but regressive because they seek to exert it on
behalf of values and interests generally incompatible with those I
favor. The fourth perspective explicitly adopts values that focus on
justice and human dignity, and strives to shape the emerging order of
nonterritorial central guidance so that it serves these values.
Four types of world order options thus deserve serious consideration.
My interest is to provide a rationale for selecting a preference model
which can orient international legal studies within the new paradig-
matic framework of a system shift from territorial centralization. For
convenience, each type of world order option will be represented by
an illustrative case. However, it should be understood that each type
of option is itself capable of wide variation with respect to both struc-
ture of implementation and normative orientation. Nevertheless, the
following four types of options can be usefully stressed at this stage of
inquiry:
Option A: World Government
(illustrated by the Clark-Sohn plan)
Option B: Concert of Great Powers
(illustrated by the Kissinger or Pentagonal design)
Option C: Concert of Multinational Corporate Elites
(illustrated by the Trilateral Commission)
Option D: Global Populism
(illustrated by the World Order Models Project)
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These four options will be appraised as world order constructs from
three perspectives: (1) considerations of attainability-whether it is
plausible, even if unlikely, to achieve sufficient structural leverage
under specified conditions to bring the proposed reforms into being;
(2) considerations of desirability-whether the proposed reforms would
be likely to operate in a desirable manner as assessed by value priori-
ties; and (3) considerations of durability-whether realization of the
reforms would produce a reasonably stable international environment
in which there would be no strong likelihood of early relapse. Diagram
II may aid the reader in the following discussion of these options.
A
The Clark-Sohn proposals are designed to produce a peaceful and
more just world by combining total disarmament with a greatly
augmented United Nations."0 They provide a model of an alternative
world system that seeks to realize values of peacefulness and equity. It
seeks as well a balance between the amount of central guidance needed
to create confidence in the disarmament process and the amount of
protection needed to bar encroachment by the center on zones of
autonomy of national societies. As such, Clark and Sohn have evolved
a plausible, carefully conceived, enlightened world order system that is
probably best classified as a model of weak or limited world govern-
ment. In effect, the Clark-Sohn plan expects national governments to
implement the scheme voluntarily by entering into a new social con-
tract. The fundamental goal is war prevention; the basic nexus of
transformation is a constitutional convention.
Such proposals, as matters now stand, are both unrealistic, since they
shed no light on the transition problem, and misleading, since they
assume that existing elites will either voluntarily evolve a new world
order system that diminishes their relative power, wealth, and prestige
or will be receptive to such adjustments. To show the promised land
across an unbridgeable river is to encourage either quietistic despair
(because the future is unattainable) or confirm the status quo (because
the present setting is the only meaningful one). Either attitude helps
power-vielders discourage recourse to genuine strategies of transforma-
tion.81
80. See G. CLARK & L. SOHN, supra note 77; for a recent perspective on proposals by
Louis B. Sohn, see INTRODUCriON TO WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW (G. Clark &. L.
Sohn eds. 1973).
81. For an overall critique of legalist thinking about drastic global reform of which
the Clark-Sohn proposals are an example, see W. SCHIFFER, supra note 76; W. SCHIFFER, A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MODERN CONCEPT OF WORLD ORGANIZATION (1954). For specific
critical comments on the Clark-Sohn proposals along these lines, see M. McDOUGAL 9- F.
FELICIANO, supra note 68, at 369-70, 374.
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These proposals are a reasonable solution to current challenges, al-
though not the only statement, or even the best statement, of what the
goals of global reform should be. But they drop as dead weights on
present social reality.82 The only "quick fix," one which their pro-
ponents usually avoid, would be to tie their advocacy into apocalyptic
scenarios of the future; perhaps these proposals are useful instruments
to have in the intellectual survival kit should World War III or some
other global catastrophe occur which suddenly creates receptivity to
change.
To be worthy of investigation, a world order option must have a
transition strategy that is credible, as well as a reasonably coherent
model for dealing with the challenge of interdependence amid scarcity.
It is not necessary, and probably would be misleading, to offer a blue-
print for a future world order system at this stage of the transition
process; what I call "the fallacy of premature specificity" is characteris-
tic of Option A initiatives, which tend to be static and apolitical.
B
The Kissinger design seeks to freeze the geopolitical status quo
through the moderation of political conflict among the most powerful
governments. 83 If such moderation is successful, then the prospects of
managing Third World discontent can be undertaken without much
threat to the global status quo. The design is hierarchical and ex-
ploitative; it fails to treat economic misery, ecological decay, political
repression, or population pressure as genuine world order issues.8 4 In
contrast, energy flows, monetary stability, the repression of terrorism,
the elimination of drug flows, and the exploitation of ocean resources
are high on such a world order agenda. As a consequence, we have a
82. Legalists tend to overestimate reason and rationality in human affairs, as well as
the potency of men of good will. As a result, they maintain a naive conception of power
that fails to cope with the problem of evil, with irrationality, passion, and vested beliefs.
In this regard, the Clark-Sohn proposals, as expectations rather than as statements of
preference, seem almost totally apolitical, or what is worse, even antipolitical. Such a
posture on politics for putative reformers constitutes a serious flaw. Nietzsche has
delivered the message against the voice of reason in its clearest form; among modern
writers who stress the ascendancy of evil in social and political realms are Thomas Mann,
Harold Pinter, and William Irwin Thompson.
83. I have argued to this effect in an essay, What's Wrong with Henry Kissinger's
Foreign Policy? (Princeton Univ. Center of Int'l Studies, Policy Memorandum No. 29,
1974).
84. This allegation is not refuted by references to Kissinger speeches in which a
sensitivity to these issues has been expressed. Rhetorical postures do not entail behavioral
positions, but may operate as substitutes for them. I believe the Kissinger conception of
world order, to the extent embodied in policy, has not been responsive to the issues
mentioned in the text.
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"law and order" variant of central guidance, whose success is fully
compatible with domestic repression and global inequality. Kissinger
does not appear to lose sleep over military repression or even torture
instituted by friendly regimes in South Korea, Brazil, or now Chile;
nor does he even appear to exhibit more than a rhetorical concern
about Soviet repression of dissent.8 5
The ethos is neo-Darwinian: in a setting of global scarcity all will
suffer unless some prevail. Therefore, the powerful will prevail. In a
Darwinian sense their prevalence is adaptive for the species, and is
also ethically acceptable because those who tend to shape the future
are the most deserving. It seems to me that international law, as one
would expect, has generally followed the directions set for it by geopo-
litical tendencies, and that the Kissinger conception of the future is
generally, if tacitly, supported by most international lawyers, although
without the negative interpretation I have made.8s
Why is this support ill-conceived? Such central guidance makes
vicious struggle in the future far too likely. The dominant actors will
be challenged by immensely powerful social and political forces that
are prepared to suffer greatly in order to cast off the yoke of hegemony.
With expected technological developments it is quite conceivable that
a Third World Hitler will emerge and initiate a desperate crusade
that could well include recourse to nuclear blackmail. To forestall
such danger, the case for surveillance and repression will seem irresist-
ible. We will live in an Onvellian mind camp, made secure by the
ultra-sophisticated technologies of human control.
There is a second problem. Ecological planning for the planet seems
to require longer time horizons and much better planning and co-
ordination than this Pentagonal design provides with respect to the
global process of economic development. With inequality structured
into the world order system in a setting of rapidly expanding popula-
tion, especially among the poorest peoples of the world, it will be virtu-
ally impossible to put an effective brake on resource use or environ-
mental deterioration. With self-interest as the main engine of economic
distribution, we anticipate no capacity to identify, let alone implement,
a concept of planetary interest. Already evident is the decline of what
small altruistic element earlier manifested itself in the foreign aid area.
Thus the Kissinger design is self-destructive, violence-prone, and
85. Specific reinforcement of this charge is made in a careful recent assessment of
this aspect of Kissinger's foreign policy. Binder, The Pragmatism of Nixon's Foreign
Policy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1974, at 6, col. 3.
86. See, e.g., E. RoSrow, supra note 75.
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ecologically hazardous. It purchases a few extra years of material
prosperity and geopolitical dominance at immense costs in moral and
ecological terms, while incurring grave risks of geopolitical disintegra-
tion and ecological collapse.
C
Option C can be illustrated by the recent dream-child of David
Rockefeller, the Trilateral Commission. This Commission intends "to
bring the best brains in the world together to bear on the problems of
the future."87 The Commission is almost exclusively drawn from the
ultra-elite ranks of North America, Japan, and Western Europe, and
unless "the best brains" are defined as those inhabiting the most
affluent bodies, it has many intelligent individuals, but virtually none
of the best brains among its membership. It does bring together a very
impressive array of influentials, almost all of whom possess easy and
effective access to the topmost levels of power, wealth, and prestige. 88
In Trialogue, the newsletter of the Commission, Rockefeller is
reported as believing that "private citizens are often able to act with
greater flexibility than governments in the search for new and better
forms of international cooperation."'8 What is not explicit, but may
underlie Option C, is a fear about the consequence of uncooperative
governments which become beholden to domestic constituencies whose
interests are at variance with those of the multinational corporation,
because such constituencies become either nationalistic, or ideological,
or humanistic.
Why is such an initiative worthy of note? First of all, its formation
expresses a general recognition by the elites in the most powerful states
that there is an emergent global crisis of unprecedented proportions
that involves, in particular, the capacity of capitalism to adapt to the
future; it deserves comparison with more globalist and intellectual
undertakings such as those sponsored by the Club of Rome.10 Second,
the Commission's formation reflects the view that national governments
are not necessarily capable on their own of working out the adapta-
tions that are necessary to sustain the existing elites in power in these
87. D. Rockefeller, quoted in PROSPECTUS OF THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION (1973). The
Commission is described in the subtitle of the Prospectus as "A Private American-
European-Japanese Initiative on Matters of Common Concern."
88. The membership of the Commission is listed in the Prospectus, supra note 87.
89. 2 TRIALOGUE 5 (Nov. 1973).
90. See, e.g., D. MEADOWS, J. RANDERS & W. BEHRENS, THE LIMITS To GROWTH: A
REPORT FOR THE CLUB OF ROME'S PROJECT ON THE PREDICAMENT OF MANKIND (1972); M.
MEsAROvIC & E. PESTEL, MANKIND AT THE TURNING POINT (1974).
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three centers of global wealth. Such a nongovernmental initiative can
be currently understood as a complement to the managerial geopolitics
of Henry Kissinger which, by its stress on a so-called "structure of
peace," 9' conceivably imperils the structure of wealth constituted by
the capitalist sector of the highly industrialized portion of the world.
The Trilateral Commission can be conceived, I think, as a geoeconomic
search for a managerial formula that will keep this concentration of
wealth intact, given its nonterritorial character, and in light of the
multiple challenges to it from Arab oil interests, the Communist bloc,
and various expressions of statism. In a sense, the vistas of the Trilateral
Commission can be understood as the ideological perspective represent-
ing the transnational outlook of the multinational corporation.
This initiative deserves note, furthermore, because the emphasis on
devising transnational solutions and on consensus-building among
elites is responsive to the nonterritorial dimensions of the crisis in the
state system. The Trilateral Commission is an important initiative be-
cause it is constituted in such a way as to possess structural leverage: it
has a formidable transition capability. But its reformist goals are not
concerned with globalist solutions based on the interplay of peace and
justice considerations. The Chinese speak of a world divided into
predators and the prey, and in these terms, Option C represents an
initiative of the predators. Put less ideologically, the Trilateral Com-
mission embodies a strategy of transition that does not emphasize
empathy and equity, much less equality, and hence has to rely upon
patterns of dominance, repression, and violence, administered if pos-
sible by territorial governments that provide local police protection.
The actual value orientation of the multinational corporate elite as
embodied in the Trilateral Commission is difficult to discern, since
the Commission is so recent and its overall perspective is still being
shaped. As matters now stand, it seems allied to the Kissinger outlook,
but more transnational and less governmental (or static) in perspective
orientation. That is, the class affinities are cross-cultural and trans-
national, and there is less emphasis upon distinctive interests of one
particular state in the system or of the well-being of its domestic popu-
lation. The Trilateral Commission also tentatively takes an implicit
stand against socialism as a mode of economic organization and as a
strategy for carrying humanistic ethics into the real world. The Kiss-
inger design is agnostic on these questions so long as it can keep its own
91. For perhaps the most authoritative statement of the character of "the structure of
peace," the cornerstone of the Kissinger foreign policy, see R. NIXON, ANNUAL REPORT ON
FOREIGN POLICY, H.R. Doc. No. 96, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-13 (1973).
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national structure securely under a capitalist mode of organization and
can profitably penetrate most other economies. Indeed, domestic poli-
tical constraints on foreign economic policy make the welfare of the
national population of constituent states much more central to a great
power geopolitical solution than to a transnational geoeconomic
solution.
The early work of the Trilateral Commission has consisted mainly
of a series of occasional papers, "Triangle Papers," on broad issues of
international cooperation such as money and energy.92 These analyses
of current issues, stressing items on the international economic agenda,
have advocated liberal solutions to current problems and have stayed
away from the adoption of neo-Darwinian tactics. Thus despite its
socio-economic class affinities, the Trilateral Commission seems to
represent an enlightened variant of Option C; it may indeed be partly
regarded as an effort to persuade its transnational economic con-
stituency to reject harsher, more selfish strategies for the protection
of its various interests.
George Ball put the case for this transnational economic approach to
world order in a form that corresponds closely to the central theme of
this article: "The multinational corporation not only promises the
most efficient use of world resources, but as an institution, it poses the
greatest challenge to the power of a nation-state since the temporal
position of the Roman Church began to decline in the 15th century."9 3
Richard Barnet and Ronald Mueller initiate their book-length inquiry
with a related and striking assertion: "[T]he men who run the global
corporation are the first in history with the organization, technology,
money, and ideology to make a credible try at managing the world as
an integrated unit."94 I do not want to imply that David Rockefeller
may be best understood as the new Pope Innocent X, but I do believe
that there is a new ideology of geoeconomics that is a secular vision of
Unam Sanctam. By this I mean only that the transnational ideology of
the multinational corporate elite seeks to subordinate territorial poli-
tics to nonterritorial economic goals, just as the Papacy in Unam
92. The first several Triangle Papers have been distributed: M. KAJI, R. COOPER & C.
SEGRf, TOWARD A RENOVATED WORLD MONETARY SYSTEM (No. 1, 1973); F. DUCHfNE, K.
MUSHAKOJI & H. OWEN, THE CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (No. 2, 1973); R.
GARDNER, S. OKITA & B. UDINK, A TURNING POINT IN NORTH-SouTH ECONOMIC RELATIONS
(No. 3, 1974); G. PALIANO, P. TREZISE & N. USHIBA, DIRECTIONS FOR WORLD TRADE IN
NINETEEN-SEVENTIES (NO. 4, 1974); J. CAMPBELL, G. DE CARMOY & S. KONDO, ENERGY: THE
IMPERATIVE FOR A TRILATERAL APPROACH (No. 5, 1974).
93. Quoted in HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 93d CONG., 2d SEs., REP. OF OFFICIAL
VISIT TO CONGRESS BY A DELEGATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 40 (Comm. Print. 1973).
94. GLOBAL REACH: THE POWER OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 1 (1974).
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Sanctam sought to place the spiritual sword of the Church above the
secular sword of national kings.
What does this new Unam Sanctam offer? It offers efficiency in
resource use, maximum economic development, and an end to in-
ternational political conflict. IBM proclaims from a Manhattan sky-
scraper "world peace through world trade." The corporate board rooms
of the multinational corporation tend to have maps with no political
boundaries. In its outlook, and even in its management, the multi-
national corporation is becoming cosmopolitan; the ideological fervor
of the Cold War has been replaced by ideological indifference. The
world order solution promised by "the cosmocorp" has been described
as "the businessman's peace." Or, as a recent article put it: "Alexei
Kosygin has a friend at Chase Manhattan... and his name is David
Rockefeller."
What is wrong? Is it not a viable, indeed the only viable way of
promoting transition to a post-statist system of world order? Un-
fortunately, most of the criticisms directed at the Pentagonal design ap-
ply here. Option C is a creature of economic inequality and needs a
political support structure. It is not accidental that International
Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) tried to organize illegal interven-
tionary efforts to thwart Allende's ascent to power in Chile, or that
multinational corporations find the militarism of regimes in Brazil and
even Peru congenial to their interests. Of course clumsy efforts at
business-sponsored intervention are deplored-most of all, I suspect, by
the Trilateral Commissioners themselves. They can hardly help but
realize that such a fiasco is discrediting, just as counterinsurgency
enthusiasts must have been appalled by the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Even
ITT has acknowledged its gaffe by employing a high former State De-
partment official, Samuel de Palma, as its de facto Secretary of State, al-
though disguised by his job description as advisor to the president for
international policy. It's a bit like the CIA cleaning house after the
Bay of Pigs: the counter-revolutionary policy is not renounced, but
only its pursuit by ineffectual and discredited means.
95. Shapiro, Alexei Kosygin has a Friend at Chase Manhattan .... N.Y. Times, Feb.
24, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 11. It seems useful to add a caveat. Referring to the multi-
national corporation or the multinational corporate elite is a gross simplification. There
are various kinds of multinational corporations, with various interpretations of the world
and of their interests, and with varying effects on the societies in which they operate. To
illustrate, there is a great difference between the manufacturer of consumer durables
(requiring a middle class market) and the builder of economic infrastructure in the form
of bridges, dams, roads. Nevertheless, despite these crucial diversities, it remains useful
and valid to generalize the outlook and impact of the multinational corporation as a
globalizing phenomenon of prime significance.
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To thrive in a Third World setting, the multinational corporation
needs a repressive, exploitative governmental structure such as that of
Brazil. If this kind of national economic setting does not exist, then
the corporation's well-being may require diplomatic protection,
whether it be of the crude sort that ITT sought from the CIA, or of the
more sophisticated sort that resulted after Allende was in power. In
other words, the multinational corporate solution is viable only in con-
junction with the support of powerful governments that possess strong
military capabilities. Multinational corporations appear to depend on
the state system even as they act as agents of its transformation. Further-
more, the Trilateral Commission perspective will be as blind to
ecological hazard and human misery as the Kissinger design. Perhaps
to a greater degree even than national governments because of its class
character, the Trilateral Commission is likely to be oblivious to the
need for humanizing policies even if carried out at a national level.
Therefore, I find the outlook of the Trilateral Commission un-
acceptable, despite its effort to mobilize a transnational nonterritorial
consensus on world order issues. It remains hegemonial in the ex-
treme; as a result it cannot cope with either the social question (the
alleviation of misery), the political question (the elimination of repres-
sion), or the ecological question (the defense of the planet and its re-
sources). It is therefore even unlikely to keep its promise to deal with
the military question (the avoidance of large-scale warfare).
What general principles can we derive from these responses to the
crisis in the state system? First, it is impossible to contribute to the
process of changing consciousness for a new world order without a
credible strategy of transition. Second, a credible strategy of transition
is not necessarily to be applauded if it seeks to sustain or solidify exist-
ing structures of exploitation and dominance; such initiatives are
illustrative of the right approach, but not conducive to the right out-
come. Given my interpretation, the Clark-Sohn proposals can be
ignored, whereas the work of the Trilateral Commission or the Kiss-
inger world order design should be actively opposed.
On this basis, we can now proceed to a more positive statement of
the problem of the relevance of international law to system change. I
believe that it is important to proceed on a transnational basis, to seek
structural relevance for a set of reformist goals that emphasize peace,
the elimination of poverty, the promotion of social and political justice,
and the achievement of ecological balance (i.e., both conservation of
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resources and enhancement of environmental quality). How can in-
ternational lawyers and international law contribute to such an enter-
prise? In my view, international law and lawyers can play a construc-
tive role in three major respects: first, by discerning trends toward a
new system of global order implicit in various lawmaking contexts;
second, by evaluating these trends from a transnational perspective
that is oriented around the four value positions enumerated above;
and third, by actually using these insights and evaluations in the law-
making contexts of world policy, of which by far the most important
continues to be that of state practice.
D
Let me now turn to the most difficult task, that of identifying "dan-
gerous knowledge" in the special sense of providing a problem-solving
paradigm that is a genuine alternative to the central guidance options
that I have discussed in such disparaging terms. The most formidable
purveyors of dangerous knowledge are, of course, Professor McDougal
and his numerous colleagues spread around the globe.906 His enterprise,
to create a world public order based on the values of human dignity, is
a radical vision of prime magnitude. It is universal in scope: that is, the
conception is nonhierarchical, and does not necessarily depend on the
persistence of the state system. It is process-oriented in relation to the
future: that is, it suggests we create the future by promoting pre-
ferred values in all critical arenas, starting now. It is oriented toward
the well-being of the species as a whole, and is thus naturally receptive
to both an ecological perspective and a futurist concern with assuring
the life-chances of subsequent generations.
Because we are in the historical mainstream, it is as yet unclear
whether to regard McDougal (and collaborators) as the immediate
precursors of a new world order system, in the way that we view Grotius
today, or whether the role is a more antecedent one, comparable to
that of say, Vitoria or Suarez. 7 Such a comparison will be more credible
when made from the vantage point of the 21st century. We do not
96. This dangerous knowledge is embodied, of course, in the long list of scholarly
publications emanating from the New Haven School. For a useful introductory sampling,
see M. McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, supra note 65; 1 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUB. ORD. (1974).
97. The main role of these pre-Grotians was to begin to formulate the basis of a law
of nations by distinguishing between jus naturale and jus gentium, the latter being
susceptible to human modification and discernible by custom and consent. For a brief
discussion of the contribution of Vitoria and Suarez in relation to the work of Grotius,
see P. CoRBErT, supra note 13, at 17-24.
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know whether the Law of the Sea Conference98 or some world energy
conference bound to occur in this decade will be viewed from the
perspective of the future as our Westphalia, or whether the efforts to
strike world order bargains among governments in the 1970's will be
seen instead as antecedent events in the sense that Augsburg was
antecedent to Westphalia.90 And, of course, we do not yet know
whether the McDougal jurisprudence will underlie the paradigm which
will eventually prevail in the emergent era of nonterritorial central
guidance. Its highly abstract formulations could be stretched to cover
the hegemonical options that we discard, but its humanistic animus is
both genuine and directly responsive to the objective realities of the
misery that afflicts most of the human race.
The McDougal breakthrough in reformulating on a global level the
relevance of law to human affairs is surely "dangerous knowledge." It
threatens the prevailing paradigm, and hence draws fire from certain
kinds of professionals who continue to believe in the Westphalia
paradigm.100 McDougal himself is an almost ideal purveyor of dan-
gerous knowledge, with his uncanny mix of inconsistent qualities
which are essential for discharging such a role. First of all, he has the
strength and largeness of personality to build a following that is
broader than normal partisan lines. Second, the message is helpfully
disguised by the medium: the obscurity and abstractness of formula-
tion actually require someone to either learn the new paradigm as a
98. It remains unclear whether the 1974-1975 effort to negotiate a new law of the
seas will eventuate in a widely ratified and seriously implemented treaty. It appears
likely that no major innovation in supranational authority will eventuate, either with
respect to administration, revenue-sharing, environmental protection, or dispute settle-
ment, with the possible exception of the regulation of deep sea mining operations.
Hence, the major effect of this attempt at global reform is likely to be an extension of
coastal sovereignty over a 200 mile economic zone. Such a development can be regarded
as an accentuation of the state system, rather than a step toward its supersession. See
note 66 supra.
99. The Peace of Augsburg (1555) foreshadowed the principal terms of the Peace of
Westphalia by almost 100 years. At Augsburg each prince was given the right to determine
whether Catholicism or Lutheran Protestantism would prevail within his territory; dis-
senters were assured a right of emigration. In 1648 the idea of religious toleration was
broadened at Westphalia to include non-Lutheran Protestant sects and adherents of the
Christian faith at variance with that of the prince; both could choose between emigration
and toleration.
Perhaps in retrospect the breakup of the oil tanker Torrey Canyon in 1967 will be seen
as the comparable originating event in the nuclear age.
100. Because of the decorum of the profession, much of this hostility to Professor
McDougal's works is expressed indirectly by mocking asides and the like, and is deleted
from published texts. One interesting example of criticism that comes from an inter-
national lawyer who shares McDougal's conservative views on immediate issues, but senses
an underlying cleavage is Freeman, Professor McDougal's "Law and Minimum World
Public Order," 58 A.%. J. INT'L L. 711 (1964). I have written a response explaining my
bases for supporting McDougal on a fundamental level. R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL SocIETY 654-59 (1970).
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whole or ignore the entire effort.' 0 ' And, finally, McDougal's political-
ly conservative views on current issues'0 2 disguise his real message and
permit the subversive reorientation of thinking to gain access to policy-
making at high levels without being detected as such. 0 3 Thus, the
message has to do with a processive, value-oriented approach to norms
that are appraised by reference to global criteria. These criteria are
directly at variance with the national-interest-oriented, Machiavellian
calculus that arises out of the statist paradigm as codified by inter-
national lawyers, especially since the mid-18th century, when Vattel's
treatise was published. 04 Now it is true that McDougal's work is
transitional, deriving substance from the state system as well as moving
beyond it. McDougal is no utopian. On the contrary, his writing al-
ways shows a lively sense of realism, and an understanding of the
connection between his appraisals and the dominance of states and
their rival aspirations. 10 5
To deal with the present global situation from a legal perspective, I
believe we need to develop the McDougal paradigm in several direc-
tions.100 I regard these developments as implicit in the present formula-
tions, but believe that they must be made more explicit. The domain
of ambiguity must be restricted as we move deeper into the 1970's, be-
cause we are confronted, as I have suggested, by a set of relatively
discrete world order options. The issue of choice and recommendation
becomes paramount. The advocates of Options B and C, the geo-
political minimalists and the geoeconomic maximalists, have assured
101. Professor Corbett makes an intriguingly similar comment about Grotius's tendency
to confuse the law of nature with the law of nations when he conjectures that it was
"conceivably a calculated confusion designed to endow his law of nations with the
authority of the law of nature." P. CORBETr, supra note 13, at 23-24.
102. See M. McDOUGAL & AssocIATEs, supra note 65, at 763-843; McDougal, Foreword
to J. MOORE, LAw AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR at vii-xiv (1972); McDougal, The Soviet-
Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597 (1963).
103. See generally R. FALK, supra note 100, at 342-77, 642-59; R. FALK, LEGAL ORDER
IN A VIOrNT WORLD 80-96 (1968); Kissinger, The White Revolutionary: Reflections on
Bismarck, in PHILOSOPHERS AND KINGS: STUDIES IN LEADERSHIP 317-53 (D. Rustow ed. 1970).
104. All of the principal international law treatises illustrate the predominance of the
statist paradigm. See, e.g., C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTER1RETED AND
APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES (2d rev. ed. 1951); D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2
vols. 1965); L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1948).
105. This point is evident in an influential study of the relevance of domestic public
order to the prospects for the growth of world law. McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 65,
at 3.
106. I appreciate the difficulty of implementing such a recommendation. A radical
(in the sense of "root" or "fundamental") redefinition of what constitutes knowledge for
lawyers underlies the work of the New Haven school. To extend that redefinition in new
social and political directions would require a degree of intellectual flexibility not com-
mon among intellectual innovators, who tend, perhaps out of necessity, to be purist
rather than eclectic in their evolution. Nevertheless, the argument for innovation is ad-
vanced in the text in the hope that at least an altered dialogue arising out of a dynamic
challenge and response will result.
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power, wealth, prestige, and access to media. Do advocates of Option
D have any offsetting capabilities? I believe they have a superior
understanding of the historical situation and an authenticity that is
safeguarded by their powerlessness; that their line of recommendation
appears to have the best insight into the well-being of the human
species and the viability of the planet is also a source of political and
moral strength. Option D proponents are beginning to become partic-
ipants in the emerging debate on global reform. 1
0 7
As matters now stand, McDougal's approach to global reform does
not relate itself specifically to the context of critical choice. Indeed, it
even allows advocates of Option A and B to adopt his framework of
reasoning and rhetoric, without altering their incompatible behavioral
modes. Let me be more specific with reference to several issues:
Values. McDougal's values are not specified in relation to any of the
outstanding problems of mankind such as poverty, population pres-
sure, violence, and ecological decay. As a result, elitist perspectives can
employ his terminology to disguise their indifference to a public order
of human dignity. I think that the values of a new paradigm for in-
ternational legal studies must be placed in direct relation to the agenda
of concrete problems facing the human community.
Governments. McDougal tends to identify the representations of
governments with the well-being of the peoples of the world. In my
view, such an identification runs contrary to fact with respect to any
humanistic schedule of values. In many parts of the world, govern-
ments regard most of their own citizens as potential or actual antag-
onists and rely on repressive means to sustain their own power. There-
fore, I believe it is necessary to draw a sharp distinction between the
well-being of governments and the well-being of peoples or their
countries.108 This distinction must be drawn vis-4t-vis the values speci-
fied in terms of problems (or social goals). 10 9
107. These include even such a mainstream analyst of foreign policy as Brzezinski,
U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus, 51 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 708-27 (1973).
108. A characteristic of statist-paradigm thinking is to grant national governments a
monopoly over representational legitimacy, i.e., the competence to represent the well-
being of the citizenry. But cf. McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Nationality and Human
Rights: The Protection of the Individual in External Arenas, 83 YALE L.J. 900 (1974).
Where national governments sustain power by repressive as distinct from voluntaristic
and contractual means, such a presupposition does violence to any ethical assessment of
public well-being. Most preferred models of future central guidance (and clearly Option
D) distribute representational legitimacy among several categories of actors.
109. This distinction becomes clearer (and easier to make) if one shares William Irwin
Thompson's brilliantly expressed skepticism regarding governmental capacities:
Some of our problems stem from the fact that authority today pretty much comes
from those who have power. What we need is a clear distinction between authority
and power-as in the days of Christ and Caesar before the papacy. We must realize
that there are areas of human culture in the imagination, in religious instincts, in
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Central guidance. McDougal is nowhere explicit about the historical
pressures toward nonterritorial global integration and °the principal
ordering options which can be derived therefrom. I believe it is of
critical importance for the new paradigm to pose these choices and to
endorse the image of central guidance which corresponds most closely
with the performance criteria set forth. Of course, it should be under-
stood that just as Westphalia did not identify precisely the time at
which the state system originated, so any emergent central guidance
system will evolve in new directions, toward new goals, embodying the
seeds of one or more new paradigms within itself.
Transition strategy. Because of its noncommital approach to the
policy content of world order values and to the shape of the future
world order system, McDougal's approach never describes any path
of transition from the present late phases of the state system to the
emergent form of central guidance most likely to realize preferred
values.
The World Order Models Project can be understood as an unwitting
attempt to develop the New Haven approach so that it better satisfies
the needs for a global reform movement. The World Order Models
Project (WOMP) was organized in 1967 by Professor Saul Mendlovitz
under the auspices of the Institute for World Order, and consists of
eight regional groupings of scholars: Soviet Union, Africa, India,
Japan, Latin America, Western Europe, United States, and a self-
consciously nonterritorial transnational perspective."10 After meetings
among the directors over the past five years, each participating group
in WOMP is producing its own book depicting proposals for global
reform by the end of the century."' There has been no effort to achieve
a consensus, except to agree on a common framework of inquiry. The
research directors have agreed to identify the goals of global reform as
the full dimensions of human culture rather than its mere technocratic husk that
are important and that have to be affirmed. If we look upon our Presidents as
colorless managers and develop alternative systems for cultural regeneration, then I
think we have ways of creating new institutions that aren't weighted down with
institutional inertia.
Thompson, The Mechanists and the Mystics, I NoOSPHERE 1-2 (1973).
110. See Mendlovitz 9- Weiss, Toward Consensus: The World Order Models Project of
the Institute for World Order, in INTRODUCTION TO WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW,
supra note 80, at 74-97.
111. These books will be published individually in 1975 and 1976. Each book is an
independent venture. However, early drafts were commented upon at meetings of the
research directors held in the 1970-73 period; and a common acceptance of the four
world order values underlies the work of WOMP. In actuality the manuscripts exhibit a
surprising degree of diversity; they treat the transition concept in quite different ways,
ranging from superseding the state system to merely reforming it. The first books in the
series are R. KOTHARI, FooTsTEPs INTO THE FUTURE (1975); A. MAZRUI, A WORLD FEDERA-
TION OF CULTURES (1975); ON THE CREATION OF A JUST W LoRI ORDER (S. Mendlovitz ed.
1975).
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minimization of violence, maximization of social and economic well-
being, maximization of social and political justice, and maximization
of ecological balance. There is also agreement on the need to make
proposals that are desirable and attainable, and to indicate the con-
tours, at least, of a world order solution to the problems of the present
system. Despite this shared outlook there is considerable diversity as to
relative weighting of values, preference models, transition tactics and
strategies."
12
In my own WOMP book A Study of Future Worlds, I set forth a
framework (reflected in Diagrams I and II) with respect to the realiza-
tion of a preferred form of central guidance that is relevant here. The
change of world order systems comes about as a consequence of a three-
stage transition process.113 My argument is that the primary concern of
the present stage (ti) is consciousness-raising, by which I mean the
beginnings of a consensus as to world order challenges and an accept-
ance of a value orientation similar to Option D. In my S2 world-that
is, a system in which the four performance criteria are substantially
realized-the patterns of central guidance are organized around four
corresponding functional areas. These functional systems are linked
with technical organs of coordination and political organs of oversight.
The political organs have tripartite representation: peoples, nongovern-
mental organizations and governments. The constitutional structure
sacrifices efficiency to achieve diversity and inhibits abuse of concen-
trated power. I regard intermediate forms of central guidance as the
most plausible, i.e., those which involve a net increase in the capacity
for global administration, but not necessarily a net increase in bureau-
cratic presence vis-i-vis human existence at most levels of social organ-
ization. In Option D, I envision two countervailing organizational
tendencies: (1) centralization of functional control and planning to
enable equitable allocation of scarce resources, and (2) decentralization
of political structures combined with localization of identification
patterns. On the level of bureaucratic presence and loyalty attachments
there is envisioned by the end of t 3 an outward mutation in the direc-
tion of central guidance, and an inward mutation in the direction of
localism, subnational autonomy and participatory relevance.
Admittedly, it is difficult to expect very much to emerge from a
group that has chosen an acronym as atrocious as WOMP. As a partici-
112. I have depicted the WOMP/USA conception of central guidance more fully in
R. FALK, supra note 6,'at 224-76. As research director of WOMP/USA my conceptions
about global reform represent the basis of this book and are similar in tenor to the out-
look of this article.
113. See diagram at p. 995 supra.
1014
Vol. 84: 969, 1975
A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies
pant in the project I am nevertheless very enthusiastic about our ex-
perience to date: for the first time a nonaffiliated group of scholars-
mainly nonlawyers-has coordinated on a worldwide basis an inquiry
into the prospects for global reform in this century. It is no more than a
first step in the consciousness-raising process that must occur, but I
believe it is a notable step because it puts a program for global reform
into the center of practical politics.
Of course, skeptics will abound. What difference can such an initia-
tive make in a world ruled by petropolitics and missile postures? There
is a Zen saying: "If I raise my little finger I alter the course of the
stars." The point is not that the pebble causes a ripple, but that we
do not have a firm grasp on the causation of social change at the global
level. In these circumstances, it at least makes sense to raise one's little
finger, especially when adversaries are raising their hands and stamp-
ing their feet. It is also only sensible to be tentative about expectations
for the future, and to relate to developments as they unfold. The litera-
ture of global reform is marred by the prevalence of congealed legalism.
This stance is at variance with the dynamic, process-oriented approach
that is required by a context of transition.
E
Although analytic purposes may require us to distinguish as sharply
as possible among the principal central guidance options, certain dan-
gers do arise from such artificial separation. The options I have
described are ideal types; in actuality we are dealing with human
beings, whose interests, values, roles, and consciousness may overlap
the boundaries set by the options as depicted. I would expect the over-
all context to lead adherents of one option to react to and learn from
adherents of competing options, whether by reading each other's books
or by borrowing each other's rhetoric and perspectives. Indeed, Option
D, as "the enemy on the left," so to speak, may exert its behavioral
impact indirectly, via assimilation by the principal exponents of Op-
tions B and C. To illustrate, it seems clear that the importance of
Norman Thomas's Socialist Party should not be gauged by its unim-
pressive results at the election polls, but by the extent to which its
thinking shaped the New Deal programs of the mainstream Democratic
Party. Similarly, if a populist movement for global reform of any
magnitude gets started in key countries such as Japan, France,
Germany, India, the United States, and within the ranks of the Soviet
and Chinese Communist parties, then it is likely to reshape the way in
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which governments and multinationals go about fostering their objec-
tives in the transition interval. Thus Options B and C would most
likely be skewed in the direction of D even if D itself never achieves
independent potency.
The linkages between Options B and C are also of critical impor-
tance in the years ahead. One question is whether the proponents of
Option C will be able to strike a mutually acceptable bargain with the
managerial elite of leading socialist societies, thereby establishing an
economic ethos that is global and nonideological in character. Another
question is whether the interests of Option C can be safeguarded if
they run seriously counter to nationalist demands, especially if populist
pressures intensify in key countries. In essence, this concern involves
the degree to which the multinational elite can pass upon, or at least
exercise a veto over, candidates for high governmental office. As the
years pass, it will become clearer whether the multinational elites are
the servants or the masters of the governmental elites-whether Option
C crowds out B, or vice versa. Put differently, will the multinational
elite be able to call upon the governmental system to enforce its
economic claims and to discourage or shatter political resistance, or
will the governmental system evolve a regulatory approach that super-
imposes nationalist or populist values upon the profit and productivity
ethos of corporate operations?
At present, an alarming symmetry of motives is developing between
those who adhere to Options B and C. Most governments and virtually
all multinationals are threatened by ambiguity and pluralism; their
distinct interests prosper through patterns of firm control. So long as
a government welcomes business operations according to the profits
and productivity rationale, it matters little whether a political ideology
drawn from the left or right prevails. Therefore, it is easy for corporate
elites increasingly to perceive themselves as apolitical, as well as ana-
tional and amoral. It is not surprising that capitalist tycoons return
from China filled with enthusiasm, after having witnessed order and
regimentation on a grand scale. For both global businessmen and
managers of government bureaucracies, reliability and predictability
are the prime requirements for successful operations; dissension, op-
position, and ambiguity are characteristics that can wreck things.
Therefore, the populist bias of Option D is antagonistic to the basic
drift of Options B and C, at least given the distribution of present value
orientations and relation of forces. Such antagonisms could shift to
affinities if the political context were to change in relevant ways, for
example if a world depression or prolonged ecological challenge were
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to shift the basic political-economic orientation from satisfying the
wants of a relative few to meeting the needs of the many. Such a shift
is the humanist alternative to a neo-Darwinian response, as we begin
to face worldwide shortages of both renewable and nonrenewable
resources.
IV
It follows from what I have said that we need a new paradigm for
international legal studies. To convey a sense of its contours I would
like to emphasize five elements: (1) a framework of inquiry that is
global, explicitly normative, futurist, and systematic; (2) an orientation
toward inequity that is shaped by an appreciation of the transitional
character of the international system;" 4 (3) a recognition that the out-
come of transition will be the emergence of a system of nonterritorial
central guidance; (4) an understanding that the actual shape of the
emergent nonterritorial central guidance system will be conditioned
by the interplay of statist, business, and populist social forces; (5) a
consensus that the most beneficial of the plausible central guidance
options will reflect the priority of populist claims for peace, economic
equity, social and political dignity, and ecological balance.
I believe that a jurist who is alert to these five elements will be able
to acquire a far more relevant understanding of specific legal con-
troversies than he could from the perspective of the older statist
paradigm. For vocational purposes it remains desirable to equip stu-
dents to operate within the statist paradigm, which remains dominant
in most sectors of power, wealth, and prestige. From an educational
perspective, however, what is now needed is an approach to inter-
national legal studies that is anchored in the statist paradigm, but with
one eye cocked on the emergent central guidance paradigm.
My point becomes clearer if we look at the various tides of fervent
advocacy generated by the question "Should the United States ratify
the Genocide Convention?" It is possible to oppose Senate ratification
of the Convention because it amounts, as some have phrased it, to "a
pious fraud"; the guilty governments are willing to ritualize the con-
demnation of genocide precisely because they are confident that it will
never be enforced against them. At the same time, right-wing agitators
are stirred to fury by the prospect of Senate ratification. A group called
114. Hence, in acting to overcome poverty and economic disparities in the world,
priority should be given to those approaches that help create procedures, norms, and
institutions of the sort that would facilitate the emergence of Option D as a world order
solution. In other words, with any concrete issue of world policy, short term tactics should
reflect long term preferences for global reform.
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Liberty Lobby warns that the Genocide Convention is being "pushed
by aliens to help destroy our American culture and serve the devious
ends of hostile forces carefully planted in our midst!" 11
On the other side, the main proponents of ratification, including
Senator Proxmire and a gtoup of Yale Law School faculty members,
argue that "[r]ejection of the Convention will diminish United States
capacity to influence others to comply with human rights laws and is
likely to weaken the international protection of human rights.""', But
is the United States Government really committed to the promotion
of human rights? If so, why has it trained and supported some of the
most repressive police forces in the world? Why has it not responded
to the documented accounts of genocide in Burundi?"17 Why does it
overlook its own direct responsibility for the torture of political op-
ponents even in societies, such as South Vietnam or Uruguay, where
there is considerable American leverage over official policy?' 8
Oddly enough, I think all the parties to the dispute over ratification
have a pretty strong position. It is true that the claims of the Conven-
tion are pious frauds, given the realities of genocide. But it is also true
that the claim to hold government officials, including our own, crim-
inally accountable for systematic repression of distinct ethnic groups
represents a drastic claim against the state system. This claim is espe-
cially drastic given the persistence of widespread hard-core genocidal
activity, and the pervasiveness of official patterns and practices, in-
cluding those by the United States, that strike some foreign and
domestic observers as "genocidal."
It is true that failure to ratify would weaken the credibility of
United States objections to human rights violations elsewhere in world
society. However, it is also true that, given the controversial United
States record on human rights issues, ratification would heighten in-
ternational cynicism about the status of international law. Interpreting
this ratification debate in world order terms, we see a tug of war be-
tween the opposed paradigms of statism and central guidance, as well
as an anticipatory struggle of sorts among some of the central guidance
options. For instance, those who accept Option D and are firmly en-
115. Quoted in Large, Senate is Due To Vote On A Treaty Soon-One Submitted in
1949, Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1974, at 1, col. 3.
116. Letters to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1974, at 36, col. 9.
117. For news accounts, see N.Y. Times, May 21, 1972, at 11, col. 1; June 11, 1972, at
1, col. 2; June 17, 1973, at 1, col. 2; see also R. MORRIS, M. BOWEN, G. FREEMAN & K.
MILLER, PASSING BY: THE UNITED STATES AND GENOCIDE IN BURUNDI 1972 (1973).
118. H. BROWN & D. LucE, HOSTAGES OF WAR: SAION'S POLITICAL PRISONERS (1973); R.
Orman, The Ultimate Form of Corruption, in CRIMES OF WAR, supra note 63, at 255-57;
An Interview with Philip Agee: Inside the CIA, INTERCONTINENTAL PRESS, Feb. 10, 1975,
at 173.
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trenched in the central guidance paradigm would be most likely to
find it useful to point an accusing finger at their own government. In
that sense they, like the Liberty Lobby, perceive the Genocide Con-
vention as "subversive," but unlike their reactionary colleagues, the
world order populists welcome such subversion as beneficial.
My point may be clarified by an example; take the Nuremberg
trials. There are those who speak of "the fallacy of Nuremberg,"'11 by
which they mean that because the Nuremberg decisions are incom-
patible with statism, they will therefore not be respected. However,
these spokesmen overlook the second-order effects of the Nuremberg
precedent. These second-order effects involve reinforcing a populist
and cosmopolitan conscience in matters of war and peace, a conscience
which was made manifest, for instance, in "crimes" of resistance carried
on by Americans during the Vietnam War. Daniel Ellsberg is a prime
example of a person who was actually influenced by the Nuremberg
Obligation to take steps which he perceived at the time to be illegal. In
other words, he decided to implement his understanding of the Nurem-
berg Obligation to act in opposition to crimes of war, even when such
action was in violation of domestic law.
120
Let me generalize this form of analysis of international law issues.
If we are concerned with the relevance of the paradigm shift under-
way, then there is a variety of subject matter ripe for illuminating
analysis. For example, we might explore subject matter in which lines
of significant interdependence transcend the boundaries of national
jurisdiction, such as the regulation of multinational business or of
international terrorism; the assessment of liability for environmental
damage, either as a result of spatial diffusion or of territorial and
oceanic interaction; the regulation of global monetary policy, of com-
modity pricing policy, or resource conservation policy. International
issues which involve dangerous forms of scarcity, including protection
of endangered species of the Great Whale, allocation of rights to fish
on the high seas, protection of land, sea, and air against environmental
decay, and world population policy (is it a matter of Argentinian
prerogative to plan a doubling of her population by the year 2000?)
are also appropriate focuses.
World food policy also needs to be explored: e.g., is it a matter of
119. The most careful account along these lines is E. Davidson's appropriately titled
volume, THE NUREMBERG FALLACY: WARS AND WAR CRIMES SINCE WORLD WAR II (1973).
Davidson's book illustrates the dichotomous view that since world governmental ideas do
not work we are thrown back on unrestrained statism. See note 76 supra.
120. On this line of reasoning, see Falk, Ecocide, Genocide, and the Nuremberg Tradi-
tion of Individual Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
123-37 (V. Held, S. Morgenbesser & T. Nagel eds. 1974).
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sovereign prerogative to leave cropland idle or underdeveloped when
aggregate world food shortages are producing large-scale famine?
Similarly, we might examine more closely matters in which nonterri-
torial actors are playing increasingly significant roles-for example, the
role of multinational corporations, of specialized international institu-
tions, of world social and political movements, of humanitarian initia-
tives like Amnesty International or the International Committee of
the Red Cross, of movements for global reform like the Trilateral
Commission, the Club of Rome, or the World Order Models Project.
Finally, we might look at areas where legitimacy and loyalty are shift-
ing away from the nationalist focus characteristic of the state system.
121
I am arguing that a reverse process is now underway through which
loyalty and legitimacy are shifting away from the state in two directions
simultaneously: toward the center of the globe and toward the specifics
of community and sentiment. Hence, it is important to stress the role
of the individual in war/peace and human rights settings, the role of
subnational movements for self-determination, and the significance of
cosmopolitan identifications with religious and political movements. 122
At a minimum, international lawyers should study the transition con-
text and appraise it by reference to the criteria associated with a cen-
tral guidance paradigm. Even more desirable would be an appraisal
of legal developments from a WOMP or global populist perspective, an
appraisal that would be alert to the desirability of strengthening the
prospects for an Option D solution to the world order problems of our
era.
Conclusion
International lawyers, including even those associated with the New
Haven approach, have not yet related directly enough to the transi-
tional historical situation that is already underway. We are moving
toward a new world order system based upon an augmented capacity
for central guidance and an increased role for nonterritorial actors.
The value predispositions of these actors are not predetermined. Never-
theless, the evidence seems to support a pessimistic view of the capacity
of these actors either to sustain minimum conditions of a tolerable
121. See generally Schaar, supra note 8.
122. It is relevant to note that the Chilean junta under Pinochet has, in addition to
moving against its political opponents, sent leaders of Eastern religious sect movements-
such as that of Maharaj Ji-to prison for indefinite periods. A religious movement with
ethical goals and a transnational frame of reference deprives the state mechanism of
loyalty and undermines its claims of legitimacy.
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world order, or to achieve an arrangement that promotes human
development and well-being for all the peoples of the world. The drift
is toward some new kind of geopolitical and geoeconomic hegemony
sustained by a neo-Darwinian ethos and implemented by persuasion
where possible, coercion where necessary, and violence wherever lesser
forms of coercion seem insufficient.
I believe that international lawyers can make better use of the fact
that choice is still possible in the area of value orientation. They can
help create an alternative vision of central guidance that is built
around the values of human dignity, and that is oriented toward the
possibility of a planetary community joined together by contractual
bonds rather than by hegemonical bondage. At this stage in transition,
the primary need is to interpret this unprecedented historical op-
portunity, as well as to expose the multiple jeopardies that also are
present and likely to be aggravated if either Option B or C becomes
substantially realized over the next several decades without prior shifts
in their controlling ethos. International law will be a testing ground
for the relative strength of social forces favoring B, C, and D; it is up
to humanistically inclined international lawyers and others to join the
issue by mobilizing their resources in favor of Option D.
Can it happen? Can Option D prevail over the forces arrayed against
it (or, alternatively, can Option D reshape Options B and C)? Hannah
Arendt's view as to whether her version of Option D can be achieved
provides a relevant perspective:
But if you ask me now what prospect it has of being realized, then
I must say to you: Very slight, if at all. And yet perhaps, after all,
in the wake of the next revolution. 2 3
And by revolution, Arendt means not a violent seizure of state power,
but an upsurge of energy directed toward reshaping the priorities that
now dominate the political process.
123. H. ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 233 (1972).
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